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Abstract 
The dissertation consists of two essays. The first essay investigates how oil market factors impact 
on liquidity commonality in global equity markets. I identify two transmitting channels of the 
effect on liquidity commonality, namely oil price return and volatility. Using a sample of firms 
drawn from 50 countries spanning from Jan 1995 to Dec 2015, I find that both effects in oil explain 
the liquidity commonality in countries with higher integration to oil market. In addition, I show 
that oil volatility effect is more pronounced in net oil exporters compared to net oil importers after 
controlling for oil sensitivity. My findings suggest that oil volatility effect on liquidity 
commonality is more substantial for high oil sensitive countries than oil price return effect except 
five OPEC members, where liquidity commonality is highly influenced by oil the return along 
with volatility. These results are robust to controlling for possible sources of liquidity commonality 
as found in the literature. In the second essay, I study the impact of stock liquidity on firms’ future 
investments. Since stock liquidity decreases the cost of equity, I expect firms’ future investments 
to increase with stock liquidity. Secondly, I argue that this relation is more pronounced in more 
financially constrained firms because of their limited access to external capital. Using a sample of 
more than 9800 firms, from 21 emerging markets and spanning from 2000 to 2015, I find 
supportive and robust evidence of a positive association between stock liquidity and firms’ future 
investments. Furthermore, my findings strongly suggest that the liquidity impact on corporate 
investments is highly influenced by the firms’ financial constraint levels, using four different 
definitions of financial constraints. My findings are robust due to controlling for other 
determinants of future investment suggested in the previous literature, and due to controlling for 
the country and time effects. In addition, the results seem to be consistent with the use of alternative 
measures of corporate investments and stock liquidity and with alternative model specifications 
and estimation methodologies. 
 
 
JEL classification: G12; G14; G15; Q43; G31 
Keywords: Commonality; Stock market liquidity; International equity markets; Oil price risk; Firm 
investment; Emerging markets; Financial constraints. 
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Chapter One 
Oil Market as a Source of Liquidity Commonality in Global Equity Markets 
 
1. Overview 
Stock market liquidity is defined as the easiness to buy and sell a certain stock without a loss 
in value. If stock markets are illiquid, investors can be expected to require compensations from 
taking the risk of not being able to sell out easily and inexpensively when trading stocks. Many 
studies have documented this pricing factor and showed that stock liquidity partially explains 
equity stock returns (Amihud, 2002; Chordia et al., 2001, Jones, 2002, Pastor and Stambaugh, 
2003). An asset pricing model, proposed by the theoretical work of Acharya, L.H. Pedersen 
(2005), models liquidity as a systematic risk. They show that investors gain less when the stocks 
that they hold are less correlated with the overall market liquidity, indicating a less exposure to 
market liquidity risk. Karolyi et al. (2012) argue that, such findings imply a commonality in 
liquidity among stocks, at least within countries. Chordia et al. (2000) are the first to document 
the co-movements of market liquidity in equity markets, which has been verified by Hasbrouck 
and Seppi (2001) and Huberman and Halka (2001).  More recently, other studies find evidence 
for the liquidity co-movements in other financial markets. For example, Marshall et al (2011) 
examine liquidity commonality in commodity future markets, and find a strong commonality in 
16 different commodity futures, which also seem to be affected by the liquidity of stock markets.  
Understanding what causes commonality in liquidity is crucial to predict, immune and curb 
the negative effects of a contagious sudden dry-up in the equity markets. In addition, pricing risk 
factors and their premiums requires understanding of their dynamics and components. For this, 
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the recent studies seem to be concerned about the sources of commonality in liquidity and 
generally divide those sources into two sides. One side includes factors that are considered 
demand-side factors, such as the correlations in trading activity, structure of ownership and 
exchange rates (Chordia et al, 2000; Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001; Kamara et al. 2008; Dang et 
al., 2015a; Koch et al., 2016). Chordia et al (2000) and Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) find 
evidence for trading activity correlations as sources of such co-movements in individual stocks 
liquidity. Kamara et al. (2008) find a positive association between increases in institutional 
trading and commonality in liquidity, confirming the prediction of Gorton and Pennacchi (1993), 
who predict that equity basket trading increases liquidity commonality for the stocks in the 
basket. Dang et al. (2015a) study the effect of the U.S. and international cross-listings on 
liquidity commonality of the cross-listed firms. Their main finding suggests that the liquidity 
commonality of cross-listed firms is lower with home market and higher with host market after 
cross listing. Koch et al (2016) find that stocks with high mutual fund ownership have more 
commonality in liquidity compared to low mutual fund ownership. 
The other side includes factors that are considered supply-side factors, which are related to 
the sources that fund investors (Coughenour and Saad, 2004; Hameed et al, 2010). Coughenour 
and Saad (2004) find that the co-movements of liquidity in certain stocks are caused by specialist 
firms that provide liquidity for certain stocks in their portfolios. Hameed et al (2010) examine the 
impact of negative market returns on the evidence liquidity commonality in equity markets. They 
find that the liquidity of individual stocks commonly drops with large negative market returns. 
They argue that this is because aggregate collaterals of lending agents, namely financial 
intermediaries, decline and are followed by a force of liquidations, which makes it less likely that 
those funding agents will be able to provide more liquidity to the market.  
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Using an intraday global data of 47 markets, Brockman et al. (2009) claim to be the first to 
investigate commonality in liquidity using intraday and global data as most of previous studies 
use a single-market data. They first document the commonality in individual stocks' liquidity 
with market liquidity within countries and find that Asia stock markets experience relatively the 
strongest commonality while Latin American markets have the lowest liquidity commonality. 
Furthermore, they document liquidity commonality across borders and in the regional levels 
though they find that local source of commonality has a more important role than global source 
in explaining firms’ commonality in liquidity. Lastly, they examine the effect of macroeconomic 
announcements on commonality in liquidity across the countries in their sample and find that 
local and the U.S. macroeconomic announcements partially explain commonality in liquidity 
across countries. 
  In a comprehensive framework and an international setting, Karolyi et al. (2012) investigate 
the possible explanations of commonality in liquidity implied by the literature of asset pricing 
and found in studies that directly document those commonalities. They study the commonality of 
equity markets in a sample constructed from 40 countries. They introduce several variables to 
detect the sources of such commonality in cross-sectional and time-series analyses. Overall, they 
find supportive evidence to some of their stated hypotheses.  
Most of the factors examined in the literature of commonality in liquidity are common causes 
in most economies. Even though economies are categorized in different levels of financial 
constraints, it is natural to believe that the liquidity of equity markets in almost all economies 
somehow suffer from increases in limited funding. Furthermore, demand-side factors, causing 
liquidity commonality are also common in most economies, as Karolyi et al (2012) find that 
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demand-side factors, including institutional and foreign investors and correlated trading activity, 
explain the level of commonality in liquidity in most of countries in their sample.  
In this study, we introduce oil market, which we hypothesize to help directly and/or 
indirectly explain commonality in liquidity, especially and largely in certain economies that are 
integrated with and sensitive to oil market. Unlike other sources, we predict that oil factors may 
only be relevant for economies that are oil dependent. Following Elyasiani et al (2011), we 
identify two channels, namely oil price returns and volatility, transmitting oil effect to the 
liquidity commonality in equity markets. In general, previous studies suggest that liquidity 
commonality in equity markets is driven by the lack of lending agents’ capability to fund 
investors in equity market, negatively affecting the supply source, and by investors fearing 
uncertainty thus selling off their shares in the equity market, negatively affecting the demand 
source. In this study, we argue that oil market, being a major global macroeconomic force, may 
directly and/or indirectly prompt either or both of these two sources.  
Theoretically, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) model lending agents, namely financial 
intermediaries, as that they provide liquidity to equity markets and face funding constraints as 
they have capital restrictions. When the economy experiences high uncertainty, which we argue 
that it can be attributed to high uncertainty in oil market, lending agents encounter more 
restrictions on their capital, which in turn force them to liquidate some of the assets they hold 
and weaken their ability to provide liquidity through lending (Karolyi et al., 2012). In the 
demand-side, the argument is that if the economy is relatively highly integrated with the oil 
market and therefore exposed to its associated risk; the flow of investments in its equity markets 
will be commonly affected by investors’ fear of uncertainty when oil market volatility increases. 
And, this dry-up in investment flows, caused by uncertainty, will spread across individual stocks 
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in that economy. However, during stable oil markets, the common fear of uncertainty plays a less 
important role, which results in more variations in liquidity levels across individual stocks in the 
economy, reducing the liquidity commonality in equity markets. In general, this study attempts 
to investigate the extent to which oil market may explain average commonality in liquidity of 
individual stocks within countries. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to link oil 
market with the evident liquidity commonality in equity markets. Furthermore, we utilize a large 
sample comprising 50 countries to help address and investigate multiple hypotheses related to 
how important is oil market’s role in explaining liquidity commonality in equity markets across 
the world. 
Using a sample of 36,930 firms from 50 countries, we show that oil returns and volatility, as 
a transmitting channels of oil effects on liquidity commonality only explain variations in 
liquidity commonality for countries that are estimated to be high oil sensitive. We define oil 
sensitivity as the absolute value of the difference of exports and imports scaled by the country’s 
GDP. Specifically, we show that oil volatility effect on liquidity commonality is much more 
statistically and economically significant than oil return effect in the case of equal coefficients 
restriction imposed on all equations in the high oil sensitive group. Additionally, we show that 
oil volatility effect is stronger in net oil exporters as opposed to net oil importers, after 
controlling for oil sensitivity.  Furthermore, we reinvestigate the latter conclusion and relax the 
equal constraint and allow the coefficients to vary across 4 groups, namely low oil sensitive, high 
oil sensitive and OPEC net exporter, high oil sensitive non-OPEC net exporter, and high oil 
sensitive and net importer groups. Our findings suggest that oil return has a strong impact on 
liquidity commonality in only OPEC members whereas oil volatility influence liquidity 
commonality in both net oil exporter groups along with net oil importers. Lastly, we confirm the 
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results that suggest a stronger effect of oil volatility on net oil exporters as opposed to net oil 
importers. Since market factors and oil factors may possibly be highly correlated, which may 
impact our conclusions, we repeat our analyses using oil factors that are orthogonal to market 
factors and all the results seem to hold. Finally, our results are robust to controlling for possible 
sources of liquidity commonality found explanatory of liquidity commonality in equity markets 
in previous literature. 
The association between oil market and many macroeconomic variables such as economic 
stability, economic growth, and more recently financial markets has been extensively studied 
(Hamilton, 1983; Chen et al. 1986; Huang et al., 1996; Hamilton 2003; and others). Huang et al 
(1996) illustrate the relationship between changes in oil price and stock returns by showing how 
the components of stock returns are functions of oil prices. They define a stock price as the 
discounted cash flows of a company: 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 =
𝐶𝐹
𝑅
       (1) 
Where CF is the expected cash flow of the company, and r is the expected cost of capital 
rate. Since the stock returns is the percent change in price, it follows: 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 =
𝑑(𝐶𝐹)
𝐶𝐹
−
𝑑(𝑅)
𝑅
      (2) 
Equation (2) implies that a stock return is a function of systematic changes in expected cash 
flow (CF) and expected cost of capital rates (R). Huang et al (1996) claim that oil prices and 
volatility can affect both factors.  They argue that because oil is a major resource in the 
production process in companies, changes in oil prices and volatility may have an impact on 
future cash flows. They further argue that oil prices and volatility can also affect the cost of 
capital rate through its components, namely interest and inflation rates. Many empirical studies 
using a sample from U.S. stocks (Huang et al, 1996; Elyasiani et al., 2011), developed markets 
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(Jones and Kaul,1996; Park and Rati, 2008; Degiannakis et al., 2013), and emerging markets 
(Basher and Sadorsky, 2006; Basher et al., 2012), provide supportive evidence of oil risk as a 
systematic priced factor in stock pricing. We extend this line of literature by addressing the 
question, besides its direct impact on stock prices, whether oil price indirectly affects stock 
prices through its impact on the price of liquidity risk. Since higher commonality in liquidity 
implies a higher level of the systemic liquidity risk, our findings may also have a crucial 
implication for asset pricing through finding a statistically significant association between oil 
risk and liquidity commonality in equity markets. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section two, we explain the sample selection, 
illustrate the methodology used to construct our liquidity commonality measure, oil sensitivity 
measure and oil factors and discuss some of the descriptive statistics. In section three, we outline 
the regression analysis methodology to test multiple hypotheses and show the results. Finally, in 
section four, we provide a summary discussion of our findings and offer concluding remarks.  
2. Data and Variable Constructions 
In this section, we describe our sample selection in subsection 2.1 and we show how we 
construct the measure of liquidity commonality in equity markets in subsection 2.2, the oil 
sensitivity measure and oil factors in subsection 2.3. In section 2.4, we define some variables that 
we use to control for demand and supply sources of commonality in liquidity. Then, we provide 
some descriptive statistics of our sample and preliminary analysis in subsection 2.5. 
2.1. Sample Selection 
Our sample comprises publicly traded firms from 50 countries and spans from Jan 1995 to 
Dec 2015. Namely, we collect firms daily and annual data from countries in  East Asia and 
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Pacific region (Australia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam), Europe and Central Asia region 
(Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and United 
Kingdom), Latin America region (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru), Middle East and 
North Africa region (Egypt, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates), 
North America region (United States and Canada), South Asia region (Bangladesh, India, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka) and Sub-Saharan Africa region (Nigeria). According to World 
Economic Outlook (2015), published by the International Money Fund (IMF), 27 countries out 
of the 50 countries in our sample are classified Advanced Economies whereas 23 countries are 
classified Emerging Market and Developing Economies. Furthermore, our extended sample of 
countries include 15 oil net exporter countries, which include 6 members of the Organization of 
the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Unlike previous studies, we extend the sample to 
cover major oil exporter countries, particularly the members of OPEC as they are clearly 
essential in our research question. In general, we limit our sample to those 50 countries and not 
include others because they lack sufficient data to construct the key variables in this study (e.g. 
trading volume). 
We obtain daily and annual data for the firms in our sample from Global Compustat. From 
the 50 countries, our sample consists of 36,930 firms with the earliest starting date in Jan 1995 
and the latest in Dec 2015. We include all available firms that pass our screening process, 
including firms whose data end before the latest date to avoid survivorship bias. We closely 
follow Karolyi et al (2012) in their sample screening. Specifically, we restrict the sample to 
stocks from major exchanges in each market. This is defined as the exchanges that most the 
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country’s firms are listed in. For the United States, we only use NYSE as it is evident in the 
literature that NYSE and NASDAQ are different in terms of trading volume definitions (Atkins 
and Dyl, 1997). Also, we follow Karolyi et al. (2012) and include Chinese firms listed in both 
Shanghai and Shenzhen and Japanese firms listed in both Osaka and Tokyo. To avoid including 
firms more than once, we make sure that we only include the firm observation that is reported in 
its local currency. We exclude firms with special features, namely we exclude depositary receipts 
(DRs), real estate investment trusts (REITs), preferred stocks, investment funds. The following 
screening is also applied. We exclude days on which 90% or more of the stocks listed on a given 
exchange have a return equal to zero as we consider them non-trading days. Also, we exclude 
stock-month observations if the number of zero-return days is more than 80% in the given month 
as we consider it a non-traded stock for that month. Finally, we drop stock-day observations with 
a daily return in the top or the bottom 0.1% of the cross-sectional distribution within a country to 
avoid outliers. 
We obtain data of oil market from U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). We 
collect monthly futures oil prices (NYMEX) and spot oil prices (WTI). In this study, we use one-
month crude oil futures, traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). We use one-
month futures prices following Sadorsky(2001) who show that spot prices are heavily affected 
by temporary random noise compared to futures prices1. In addition, we collect annual data of 
crude oil productions, consumptions, exports and imports for each country from the same source, 
EIA. From World Bank, we collect the annual GDP (constant 2005 U.S. dollar). From 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) by IMF, we collect data for exchange rates and Interest 
                                                          
1 For robustness check, we repeat our analysis, though results are not reported, using the spot prices of Western 
Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil and the results are similar. 
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rates for each country. And, we acquire U.S. Interest Rates data from the Federal Reserve. 
Finally, we download data for international capital flow from Treasury International Capital 
(TIC) and U.S. Sentiment Index from Jeff Wurgler’s website.2 
2.2. Commonality Measure 
Several studies use different approaches in defining liquidity commonality. For example, 
Chordia et al (2000), followed by Coughenour and Saad (2004), Brockman et al (2009), 
Hameed et al (2010), Rösch and Kaserer (2013) and Koch et al (2016), construct the liquidity 
commonality by estimating a regression of daily changes of individual stock liquidity, using 
different liquidity proxies, on equally-weighted average liquidity for all stocks. Then, they 
define liquidity commonality as the cross-sectional average coefficients from the time-series 
regressions. Another approach is used by Korajczyk and Sadka (2008), and followed by 
Marshall et al (2013), which define liquidity commonality based on principle component 
analysis. First, they calculate the average liquidity of all stocks for each day and calculate the 
mean and the standard deviation of this market average time series. Then, they define the 
liquidity commonality for each day as the difference between the market average 
observations and the time series mean scaled by the time series standard deviation. The third 
approach is used by Karolyi et al (2012), inspired by Roll (1988) and Morch et al (2000), 
which constructs liquidity commonality from the 𝑅2of a regression of individual stock 
liquidity on equally-weighted average market liquidity. This approach is also followed by 
Hameed et al (2010), Dang et al (2015a), Dang et al (2015b). However, while Hameed et al 
(2010), Dang et al (2015a) and Dang et al (2015b) and simply use the changes in stock 
                                                          
2 For full variable definitions and data sources, see Table A1 in Appendix A. 
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liquidity in one step regression to compute 𝑅2, Karolyi et al (2012) use two steps approach. 
First, they compute innovations (regression errors) from individual stock liquidity filtering 
regressions then use them to compute 𝑅2 from the regression of stock liquidity innovations 
on equally-weighted average market liquidity innovations. The latter approach is used as 
another way to avoid the potential econometric problem of nonstationary, which might be 
present if liquidity measure is simply used as the dependent variable.  
Given the similarities in our sample to the sample used by Karolyi et al. (2012), we 
choose to follow their approach in constructing our liquidity commonality measure. This may 
facilitate the interpretation of our results as it would allow us to compare, relate and confirm 
their results and findings based on a different source of data, an updated time series and a 
broader coverage of countries3. 
Due to the unavailability of high frequency data for most of the countries in our sample, 
we employ Amihud illiquidity measure since it only requires daily frequency. We add a 
constant and take the log of the sum to avoid outliers. Also, we multiply the logged value of 
the sum by minus one. This converts it to a liquidity measure as it is now increasing in 
liquidity: 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑑 = − log (1 +
|𝑅𝑖,𝑑|
𝑃𝑖,𝑑𝑉𝑂𝑖,𝑑
)      (3) 
 Where R is the daily return of stock i on day d. And, P is the share price in local currency 
and VO is the trading volume of stock i on day d.  
                                                          
3 The findings of Karolyi et al (2012) are based on a sample obtained from Datastream that covers 40 countries from 
Jan 1995 to Dec 2012. 
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 Following Karoly et al (2012) approach, we use the R2 of regressions of the innovations 
of individual stocks liquidity on the innovations of market liquidity to obtain a measure of 
commonality in liquidity. First, we estimate the residuals in liquidity for each stock based on 
daily observations for each month, creating a monthly-time series of residuals for each stock. We 
control for the lag value of liquidity, days of week in estimating residuals. Specifically, we 
estimate the following equation: 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡,𝑑 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑑−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖,𝑡
𝑛
5
𝑛=1
 𝐷𝑛 + 𝜔𝑖,𝑡,𝑑   (4) 
 Where 𝐷𝑛 denote five dummies for each day of the week. Then, we use the residuals 
from (4) to estimate the monthly measure of commonality in liquidity for each stock. Basically, 
we run daily regressions of each stock residuals obtained from (4) on the value-weighted average 
of residuals of all stocks in the same country within a month and save 𝑅2: 
?̂?𝑖,𝑡,𝑑 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡  + ∑ 𝛽𝑖,𝑡
𝑗
1
𝑗=−1
 ?̂?𝑚,𝑡,𝑑+𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,𝑑   (5) 
 The subscripts i and m denote stock i and market, respectively. Following Chordia, Roll, 
and Subrahmanyam (2000), we include one day leading and lagging values of the value-
weighted average of residuals of all stocks in the same country to capture any lagged adjustment 
in commonality. We require a minimum number of 15 daily observations to estimate the 𝑅2 of a 
stock in a given month. Regressions in equation (5) generate a monthly time-series of the 
commonality in liquidity (𝑅𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑
2  ) for each stock. For each country, we compute the 
commonality in liquidity from an equal weighted average of all commonality measures across 
firms in that country. From those averages, we have a monthly time-series of commonality 
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measure for each country. The value of the commonality measure (𝑅𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑
2 ) falls within zero and 
one, making it unsuitable to be used as a dependent variable. Therefore, to use this measure in 
regressions framework, we use the following logistic transformation, ln [
𝑅𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑
2
1−𝑅𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑
2 ].  
2.3. Oil Factors and Oil Sensitivity: 
To investigate the relationship between oil market and commonality in liquidity in equity 
markets, we identify two channels, namely oil price returns and volatility, transmitting oil effect 
to the liquidity commonality. We expect oil volatility to have a positive effect on liquidity 
commonality while we expect the effect of oil returns to be mixed. Specifically, we expect oil 
returns to negatively affect liquidity commonality in countries whose net position in oil market is 
sellers (i.e. net exporters) and positively affect liquidity commonality in countries whose net 
position in oil market is buyers (i.e. net importers). To proxy for oil market prices, we use one-
month crude oil futures, traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). As mentioned 
earlier, this is following the suggestion of Sadorsky(2001) who show that spot prices are more 
heavily affected by temporary random noise compared to futures prices. To assure a long and 
enough number of time series observations and to more accurately estimate oil volatility, our oil 
data starts from Jan 1988 and ends in Dec 2015.  We define the return of oil price as the log 
difference of the price at time (t) and (t-1). We proxy for oil volatility by allowing oil returns to 
follow the GARCH(1,1) process. Then, we compute the conditional variance of this process and 
define it as oil volatility. Based on the Akaike information criteria (AIC) and Bayesian 
information criteria (BIC), we find that the minimum values of AIC and BIC are in the random 
in the autoregressive AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) process specifications. In the chosen specification, 
ARCH and GARCH coefficients are positive and the sum of them is less than 1, meeting the 
14 
 
statistical requirements. Therefore, we assume that the oil returns follow AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) 
process. The oil return equation with the AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) process can be written as: 
𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡            𝜀𝑡|𝐼𝑡−1~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑡)          (6) 
𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑡 = ℎ𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽2ℎ𝑡−1               (7) 
Where 𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑡 is oil returns at time t and 𝜀𝑡 is the error term with a conditional mean of zero 
and a conditional variance of ℎ𝑡. 𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑡 is the conditional variance of the process and used to 
proxy for oil volatility and shocks. The parameters in equation (6) and (7) can be estimated by 
maximizing the log likelihood function that takes the following form4: 
𝑙𝑛(𝐿) = −
𝑇
2
𝑙𝑛 (2𝜋) −
1
2
∑ ln 𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
−
1
2 
∑
(𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑡 − 𝛼 − 𝛽 𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑡−1)
2
𝑉𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
          (8) 
This approach to define volatility and shocks in time-series variables has been used 
throughout the literature. For instance, Day and Lewis (1992) examines the effect of the implied 
volatility of called options of S&P 500 on stock return shocks, which they use the GARCH and 
EGARCH processes to proxy for. Furthermore, Karolyi (1995) utilizes the multivariate GARCH 
process to investigates the effect of stock returns volatility of foreign countries on stock returns 
volatility of the home country, using a sample from North America. A more relative example, 
Elyasiani et al. (2011) study the impact of oil price returns and volatility on excess stock returns 
across industries in the U.S. stock market. To proxy for oil volatility, they assume oil returns to 
follow the GARCH process and use the conditional variance from the GARCH process as a 
proxy for oil volatility. 
                                                          
4 For more details on GARCH, see Bollerslev (1986). 
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To determine the sensitivity of a country to oil market, we define the sensitivity measure as 
the absolute value of the difference between exports and imports of crude oil divided by GDP in 
U.S. Billion Dollars (constant 2005 U.S. dollar). 
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑐 =
|𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑑𝑒 𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑐 − 𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑑𝑒 𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑐|
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑐  𝑖𝑛 𝑈. 𝑆. 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑠
     (9) 
The subscript c denotes countries. Exports and Imports of crude oil are in Thousand Barrels 
Per Day. In the case that a country exports exactly as much as it imports of oil, their net zero 
position should make them the least sensitive to oil volatility thus the most hedged against oil 
risk. It is worth noting that we do not imply that this case is completely insensitive to oil markets, 
however it is relatively the least directly sensitive to oil market.  
2.4. Sources of Liquidity Commonality 
In order to address and investigate the marginal role of oil factors in explaining the variations 
in liquidity commonality over time and across the world, we need to take into account some 
factors suggested in the literature and shown to have a statistically significant association with 
liquidity commonality. The funding role that intermediaries play in the stock markets is arguably 
capable to trigger the co-movement evident in stock market liquidity. Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen (2009) argue that even though financial intermediaries, which might include specialists 
and other market makers, provide liquidity to stock market participants, they are at risk of forced 
liquidations of their securities that they hold as collateral. They argue that this risk increases 
amid large market declines and high increase in volatility. Thus, they predict that liquidity 
commonality is high during large market decline and high market volatility. Empirically, 
Coughenour and Saad (2004) find that stocks in NYSE that are handled by the same specialist 
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experience co-movement in their liquidity. Hameed et al. (2010), using NYSE stocks, find a 
direct association between liquidity commonality and large market decline and high market 
volatility. Globally, Karolyi et al. (2012) find supportive evidence of this prediction, using a 
sample of 40 countries. In addition, they also incorporate several variables that may capture the 
time variations of funding constraints. Some of these variables include U.S. commercial paper 
spreads and local short-term interest rates as they both indicate the level of credit constraints.  
To control for the supply effect, we include the market return and volatility in our regression 
equations. For each country, we define these variables as follows. The market return is defined as 
the value-weighted average of the return of individual stocks within the country. The market 
volatility is defined as the monthly standard deviation of the value-weighted market return 
multiplied by the square root of 22, representing the number of days in a month. Following 
Karolyi et al. (2012), we also control for market condition variables to capture country-specific 
effects. Namely, we control for Market Liquidity and Market Turnover, respectively, defined as 
the value-weighted average of the monthly Amihud measure and the turnover of individual 
stocks within the country. Also, we control for U.S. commercial paper spreads and local short-
term interest rates. Additionally, we include a time trend variable as Karolyi et al. (2012) show 
that a negative time trend in liquidity commonality is statistically significant in about half of the 
countries in their sample.  
The other side of the story could be labeled as the demand effect. This set of factors concerns 
about how stock traders’ activity can lead to co-movement in market liquidity. Coughenour and 
Saad (2004) and Vayanos (2004) argue that, besides the effect of market volatility on the supply 
of funding, high market volatility may create correlated trading behavior, which in turn would 
trigger liquidity commonality. Empirically, Kamara et al (2008) and Koch et al (2016) find 
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evidence to this hypothesis by observing a positive association between institutional trading and 
mutual fund ownership, respectively, with commonality in liquidity. To account for this effect, 
we follow Karolyi et al (2012) and employ the measure of commonality in turnover to proxy for 
correlated trading activity. This is established by repeating the approach we use in constructing 
our commonality in liquidity (𝑅𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑
2 ). Particularly, we define Turnover as: 
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑑 = log (1 +
𝑉𝑂𝑖,𝑑
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑦
)   (10) 
Where 𝑉𝑂𝑖,𝑑 is the trading volume of stock i on day d, 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑦 is the number of shares 
outstanding at the beginning of year y of stock i. Similar to 𝑅𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑
2 , we estimate the residuals in 
Turnover for each stock based on daily observations for each month, creating a monthly-time 
series of residuals for each stock. We control for the lag value of Turnover, days of week in 
estimating residuals. Then, we use those residuals to estimate the monthly measure of 
commonality in Turnover (𝑅𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟
2 ). As suggested by Karolyi et al. (2012), in order to assure 
that 𝑅𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟
2  is orthogonal to the supply factors as it may be correlated with funding 
constraints, we use the residuals from regressions of 𝑅𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟
2  on the supply side factors, 
namely local short-term Interest Rate and U.S. Commercial Paper for each country. 
 In addition, we control for the effect of the presence of institutional and foreign investors, 
as they may increase the correlation in trading activity (Kamara et al. 2008), by including two 
variables. Karolyi et al. (2012) argue that exchange rate changes could create incentive for 
foreign institutional investors to enter the market. As the local currency depreciates, foreign 
institutional investors are motivated to enter or increase their holdings in the market. To control 
for this effect, we include exchange rate changes of local currencies relative to Special Drawing 
Rights (SDR). This variable is obtained from International Financial Statistics (IFS) offered by 
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the International Monastery Fund (IMF). Second, we add a variable for net percentage equity 
flow using data of capital flow from and to the U.S., obtained from Treasury International 
Capital (TIC) of the U.S. Department of Treasury. For each country, this variable is computed as 
the difference of the item: “Gross purchases of foreign stock by foreigners to U.S. residents” and 
the item: “Gross purchases of foreign stocks b foreigners from U.S. residents” scaled by the sum 
of the two items. Moreover, we include a measure, suggested by Karolyi et al. (2012), to proxy 
for the level of capital market openness. We define capital market openness as the gross capital 
flow scaled by GDP, for each country. Due to the limitation in the capital flow data, some of the 
countries in our sample do not have available reports on cash inflows with the U.S., we omit 
these two variables from the regressions in such cases. Lastly, we account for investor sentiment 
as they may prompt the co-movement in liquidity through panic selling during times with high 
uncertainty (Hameed et al. 2010). To control for this effect, we use the U.S. sentiment index 
constructed by Baker and Wurgler (2006) and obtained from Wurgler’s website. 
2.5. Descriptive Statistics and Preliminary Analysis: 
In Table 1, we show some descriptive statistics of the sample. For each country, we show the 
start and the end date of the data, number of firms included, number of monthly observations, a 
net exporter indicator and a high oil sensitive indicator. A country is a net exporter if, on 
average, it exports of crude oil more than it imports and it is a high oil sensitive if its oil 
sensitivity ratio is above the median of the oil sensitivity ratios of all countries. In addition, we 
show the value weighted averages of market return, market turnover, and market liquidity along 
with market volatility, which we define as the monthly standard deviation of the value-weighted  
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics: 
This table reports some descriptive statistics of a sample from 50 countries spanning from Jan 1995 to Dec 2015. For each country, this table reports the start and 
the end dates of the sample, number of firms included, total number of monthly observations, net exporter and high oil sensitivity indicators and the means of 
market condition variables. Net Exp indicates whether the country is a net exporter, based on the average of its oil exports and imports from 1995 to 2012. High 
oil sensitivity indicates whether the country’s average oil sensitivity measure, from the period 1995 to 2012, is above the median. Oil sensitivity measure is 
defined as the absolute value of the difference in oil exports and imports scaled by GDP in constant 2005 U.S. Dollar. Market return, liquidity and turnover are, 
respectively, the value-weighted average of the return, the monthly Amihud measure-computed as the average over the month of the daily absolute stock return 
divided by local currency trading volume (multiplied by -10,0000), and the turnover of all individual stocks in each country in a given month. The market 
volatility is the monthly standard deviation of the value-weighted market return multiplied by the square root of 22 (the number of days in a month). 
Commonality measures, 𝑅𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑
2  and 𝑅𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟
2 are defined in details in section 2.2 and 2.4, respectively. The countries are sorted by its average oil sensitivity 
measure, the first country has the highest average oil sensitivity and the last country has the lowest. 
Country 
Start 
Date 
End 
Date 
No. 
Firms No. Obs 
Net 
Exp 
High 
Sens. 
Market 
Return 
Market 
Volatility 
Market 
Turnover 
Market 
Liquidity 
𝑅𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑
2  𝑅𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟
2  
Mean Stdev Mean Stdev 
Saudi Arabia 200203 201512 178 13813 Yes Yes 1.12 6.79 0.31 -0.01 28.26 11.67 25.52 5.86 
Nigeria 200008 201512 225 10188 Yes Yes 1.20 4.76 0.04 -0.08 22.12 4.10 22.48 4.06 
Kuwait 200403 201512 213 11260 Yes Yes 0.20 5.06 0.13 -35.80 22.96 5.33 24.12 4.38 
UAE 200602 201512 66 2138 Yes Yes 0.86 6.05 0.05 -0.82 21.75 5.43 26.91 5.39 
Qatar 200807 201512 45 2009 Yes Yes 0.62 3.67 0.05 -0.05 21.38 4.30 27.53 5.47 
Norway 199501 201512 389 24369 Yes Yes 0.69 5.72 0.23 -0.23 20.59 3.40 21.85 3.04 
Singapore 199601 201512 845 69742 No Yes 0.45 4.92 0.14 -1.98 20.67 2.64 22.97 4.48 
Russia 200205 201310 220 1926 Yes Yes 1.05 12.42 0.01 -3.99 24.25 5.48 26.75 5.76 
Thailand 199601 201512 804 72448 No Yes 0.46 6.93 0.21 -0.35 20.30 3.00 24.59 5.61 
S. Korea 199506 201512 1923 104102 No Yes 0.47 7.38 0.48 0.00 20.85 4.78 23.44 4.58 
Philippines 199502 201512 293 25369 No Yes 0.87 5.92 0.06 -0.46 20.72 2.96 22.60 3.76 
India 199707 201512 2958 125343 No Yes 0.27 6.98 0.12 -6.55 20.68 4.72 20.40 2.74 
Mexico 199608 201512 212 12166 Yes Yes 1.24 5.69 0.11 -0.12 19.92 4.57 27.14 5.60 
Netherlands 199501 201512 281 27464 No Yes 0.63 5.47 0.36 -0.50 19.52 2.88 23.08 5.26 
Greece 199501 201512 388 42244 No Yes -0.18 8.53 0.13 -19.65 21.84 5.22 23.18 5.02 
Belgium 199510 201402 283 21047 No Yes 0.44 4.92 0.10 -1.05 20.36 5.39 23.17 3.75 
Sri Lanka 200312 201512 314 19888 No Yes 1.54 5.27 0.04 -7.50 21.87 4.83 22.09 3.90 
Israel 200206 201512 617 28791 No Yes 0.50 4.76 0.12 -0.63 22.85 3.59 27.55 5.31 
S. Africa 199607 201512 845 46710 No Yes 0.95 4.93 0.18 -0.82 20.22 3.06 22.19 4.39 
Chile 199609 201512 226 12430 No Yes 0.98 4.03 0.05 -0.01 20.51 3.44 23.56 4.21 
Malaysia 199601 201512 1135 48875 Yes Yes 0.42 4.55 0.09 -2.66 22.10 4.81 30.24 11.61 
Egypt 200210 201512 224 14741 Yes Yes 1.53 7.80 0.14 -0.55 23.44 8.04 24.19 4.79 
Portugal 199608 201512 125 8338 No Yes 0.26 4.95 0.17 -1.86 20.62 3.94 24.49 5.67 
Pakistan 199505 201512 534 35668 No Yes 1.30 6.78 0.49 -2.63 21.54 5.18 23.66 4.16 
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Table 1 - Continued 
Country 
Start 
Date 
End 
Date 
No. 
Firms No. Obs 
Net 
Exp 
High 
Sens. 
Market 
Return 
Market 
Volatility 
Market 
Turnover 
Market 
Liquidity 
𝑅𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑
2  𝑅𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟
2  
Mean Stdev Mean Stdev 
Finland 199501 201512 213 21928 No Yes 0.91 7.76 0.17 -0.77 20.13 3.03 21.61 3.59 
Poland 199502 201512 750 53589 No No 0.62 6.23 0.10 -7.64 21.74 8.26 21.90 4.65 
Sweden 199501 201512 829 59843 No No 0.87 7.76 0.25 -0.13 20.06 2.61 21.00 2.76 
Spain 199501 201512 291 26764 No No 0.67 5.77 0.30 -0.12 20.37 6.15 22.04 3.83 
Turkey 200502 201512 399 36622 No No 1.10 6.86 0.37 -0.28 24.12 7.27 20.94 2.57 
Italy 199501 201512 514 52057 No No 0.53 5.60 0.24 -0.55 20.51 3.96 22.05 3.58 
Japan 199501 201512 3019 175208 No No 0.17 5.90 0.22 0.00 22.16 4.20 24.44 4.27 
China 199601 201512 1748 137241 No No 1.12 8.37 0.75 -0.01 39.45 12.30 33.12 9.01 
Peru 199511 201512 144 3881 No No 0.91 5.99 0.02 -3.69 24.09 7.43 26.42 5.52 
Argentina 199501 201512 133 8575 Yes No 0.90 8.93 0.02 -1.51 21.74 4.26 26.16 5.78 
USA 199802 201512 2087 89220 No No 0.59 4.78 0.48 -0.01 20.23 3.95 20.23 2.31 
Canada 199802 201512 2536 184662 Yes No 0.38 4.75 0.18 -0.87 19.86 2.01 21.25 2.81 
France 199501 201512 1499 119596 No No 0.70 5.28 0.20 -1.89 19.10 2.15 21.26 2.67 
Germany 199501 201512 977 69248 No No 0.47 4.12 0.06 -11.82 20.00 2.76 21.19 3.31 
Indonesia 199510 201512 606 43987 Yes No 1.16 7.99 0.12 -0.01 20.30 3.48 24.23 4.79 
New Zealand 199501 201512 200 13237 No No 0.65 3.35 0.10 -1.56 20.37 3.24 22.29 3.06 
Austria 199906 201512 145 8984 No No 0.70 5.02 0.13 -1.24 20.57 3.03 26.71 7.22 
Denmark 199501 201512 305 24013 Yes No 0.78 4.57 0.19 -0.21 20.57 2.90 21.37 3.01 
Bangladish 200211 201512 322 16717 No No 1.65 6.41 0.18 -0.08 27.51 8.20 31.51 6.35 
Ireland 199502 201512 109 5113 No No 0.90 6.64 0.11 -0.68 21.96 4.63 28.02 11.58 
Switzerland 199509 201402 273 31505 No No 0.67 10.42 0.21 -0.17 19.76 2.33 22.21 3.41 
Australia 199501 201512 2709 180138 No No 0.50 3.92 0.17 -1.39 19.81 2.37 20.76 2.36 
Brazil 199501 201512 252 16096 No No 0.76 12.05 0.06 -0.09 21.85 5.74 23.76 4.88 
UK 199501 201512 2189 65313 Yes No 0.48 4.57 0.24 -0.36 19.88 2.98 19.79 1.82 
Tawian 199501 201512 1072 45906 No No 0.08 6.08 0.53 -0.08 22.67 9.76 28.59 5.57 
Hong Kong 199501 201512 266 35109 No No 0.83 6.60 0.14 -0.04 20.46 2.91 25.38 4.99 
 
  
21 
 
 
market return multiplied by the square root of 22 (the number of days in a month). 
Additionally, Table 1 shows the mean and the standard deviation of the liquidity commonality 
measure (𝑅𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑
2 ) and the commonality in turnover (𝑅𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟
2 ). The largest number of firms in 
our sample is from Japan, India and Australia with 3019 firms, 2958 firms and 2709 firms, 
respectively. On the other hand, the lowest number of firms in our sample is from Qatar, United 
Arab Emirates and Ireland with 45 firms, 66 firms and 109 firms, respectively. The total number 
of firms included in our sample is 36,930 firms with a total of more than 2.3 million monthly 
observations. 
We sort countries by the oil sensitivity ratio.  The highest ratio of oil sensitivity is Saudi 
Arabia’s followed by the oil sensitive ratio of 4 OPEC members while the lowest five are Hong 
Kong’s, Taiwan’s, United Kingdom’s, Brazil’s and Australia’s, respectively. This outcome is 
unsurprising since Saudi Arabia is considered the largest exporter of crude oil with an average of 
6761.5 Thousands of Barrels Per Day from 1995 to 2012 compared to an average of 413.3 
Thousands of Barrels Per Day for the remaining 49 countries from the same period. Furthermore, 
the oil production of the five OPEC members included in our sample account for more than 24% 
of global oil production as of 2015. Five of the net exporters in our sample, namely Argentina, 
Canada, Indonesia, Denmark and United Kingdom, have oil sensitive ratio lower than the median 
of all countries’. As of the latest data available of 2014 or 2015, the average of the ratio of oil 
exports as a percentage of merchandise exports in the five OPEC members, included in our 
sample, is about 79% whereas this ratio is 2.6%, 21.4%, 29.2%, 4.9%, 7.6% in Argentina, 
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Canada, Indonesia, Denmark and United Kingdom, respectively. This clearly distinguishes the 
two groups of net exporters in terms of how their economies are dependent on oil5. 
The summary statistics of market condition and commonality variables are qualitatively 
similar to those documented in Karoyli (2012) paper. However, some quantitative differences are 
expected since we expand the time frame to cover the most recent 6 years and because the source 
of the financial data we use is different than theirs6. Table 1 shows that the monthly market 
return of all countries is positive except for Greece, which might be influenced by the 
government debt crisis that has begun in late 2009. Similar to Karolyi et al. (2012), our results 
document that France, Netherlands and Switzerland have the lowest liquidity commonality ratios 
while China has the far highest liquidity commonality ratio.  
Figure 1 shows the time path of Oil Futures price (Graph A), the average liquidity 
commonality measure (𝑅𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑
2 ) of all countries (Graph B), high oil sensitive countries (Graph 
C), low oil sensitive countries (Graph D), high oil sensitive and net exporter countries (Graph E), 
high oil sensitive and net importer countries (Graph F). In Graph A, we can clearly see three 
different oil shock episodes during our sample period. The first episode appears to be driven by 
the oil demand shock during the East Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and 1998, causing the price 
of oil to reach below $12 a barrel in Dec 1998 from a price of more than $25 a barrel in Jan 
1997. Secondly, the oil spike, which was followed by a dramatic oil price drop, seems to be 
caused by the growing demand and stagnant supply during the global financial crisis, from the 
  
                                                          
5 Oil data and oil sensitivity ratios for all countries are reported in Table A2 in Appendix A. 
6 Karoyli (2012) use Datastream while we use Global Compustat.  
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Figure 1. Time Path of Oil Price and Liquidity Commonality 
These graphs show the time paths spanning from Jan 1995 to Dec 2015 of Oil Futures Price (A) and the average of Liquidity Commonality Measure 
(𝑅𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑
2 ) of all countries (B), high oil sensitive countries (C), low oil sensitive countries (D), high oil sensitive and net exporter countries (E), high 
oil sensitive and net importer countries (F). Liquidity Commonality measure is defined in details in section 2.2. 
 
A. Oil Futures Price 
 
B. All Countries 
 
C. High oil sensitive Countries 
 
D. Low oil sensitive Countries 
 
E. High oil sensitive and Net Exporter Countries 
 
F. High oil sensitive and Net Importer Countries 
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beginning of 2007 to the mid of 2008. The price of oil soars to more than $133 a barrel in June 
2008 compared to less than $55 a barrel in Jan 2007 (Hamilton, 2011). Then, the collapse in  
demand amid the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2007-2008 causes the price of oil 
to reach less than $42 a barrel in Jan 2009 (Rogoff, 2016). More recently, the third oil shock 
episode relates to the oil price drop that starts in June 2014, driven by a mix of supply and 
demand factors. The slowing growth in emerging markets, the surprise increase in oil production 
and OPEC decision to maintain their production level of 30 million barrels a day in spite of a 
perceived excess supply, caused the oil price to plunge to less than $38 a barrel from its peak of 
more than $105 a barrel in June 2014 (Arezki and Blanchard, 2015; Kilian, 2015). 
In Table 2, we show the pairwise correlations of liquidity commonality measure (𝑅𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑
2 ) 
across countries. In Table 2 Panel A, we show the coefficients of the correlation between the 
countries in the high oil sensitive group. In Table 2 Panel B, we show the coefficients of the 
correlation between the countries in the high oil sensitive group with the low oil sensitive group. 
Unsurprisingly, the result documents some positive and statistically significant correlations 
between liquidity commonality across countries, which may indicate some common factors that 
countries around the world share and cause their liquidity commonality levels co-move. Out of 
the 25 high oil sensitive countries, 18 countries show higher percentage of statistically significant 
correlations when we compare the correlation coefficients between them and the other countries 
in their group as opposed to the countries in the low sensitive group. Also, 8 out of 10 high oil 
sensitive and net exporter countries show improvement in the percentage of significant 
correlations when we compare their correlations with the high oil sensitive countries as opposed 
to the low oil sensitive countries. This preliminary result may suggest that the liquidity
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
Panel A: This table reports the pairwise correlation coefficients of liquidity commonality measure (𝑅𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑
2 ) between countries in the high oil 
sensitive group.  Bold font refers to a statistical significance at the 1 % level. 
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Saudi 
Arabia 1.00            
Nigeria 0.17 1.00           
Kuwait 0.24 0.27 1.00          
UAE -0.01 0.12 0.21 1.00         
Qatar 0.06 0.05 0.37 0.16 1.00        
Norway -0.17 0.23 0.11 -0.03 -0.10 1.00       
Singapore -0.01 0.20 0.07 0.33 -0.17 0.24 1.00      
Russia 0.08 0.01 0.08 -0.02 N/A -0.13 0.04 1.00     
Thailand 0.01 0.15 -0.01 -0.03 -0.12 0.16 0.17 -0.07 1.00    
S. Korea -0.07 0.13 -0.04 -0.06 0.03 0.17 0.17 0.06 0.09 1.00   
Philippines -0.05 0.16 0.11 -0.07 0.13 0.31 0.16 -0.05 0.09 0.06 1.00  
India 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.08 -0.15 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.02 -0.02 0.03 1.00 
Mexico -0.07 0.11 0.07 -0.04 0.20 0.17 0.10 0.17 0.00 0.09 0.17 0.23 
Netherlands 0.18 0.08 0.00 0.01 -0.10 0.21 0.18 0.00 0.16 0.23 0.19 0.14 
Greece -0.01 0.06 0.00 -0.06 -0.16 0.13 0.08 -0.09 0.04 0.12 -0.03 0.04 
Belgium -0.03 0.09 0.10 -0.02 0.02 0.20 0.25 0.08 0.07 0.14 0.05 0.10 
Sri Lanka -0.10 0.14 0.04 -0.06 -0.09 0.28 0.17 -0.06 0.17 0.01 0.14 0.04 
Israel 0.09 0.14 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.20 0.16 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.02 
S. Africa -0.05 0.15 0.16 0.03 -0.18 0.28 0.15 -0.01 0.21 0.23 0.10 0.02 
Chile -0.10 0.08 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.12 0.14 0.10 -0.05 0.18 0.12 0.06 
Malaysia -0.05 0.13 0.15 0.20 0.03 0.13 0.51 0.25 0.15 0.24 0.00 0.13 
Egypt -0.07 0.03 0.06 0.20 0.19 -0.06 0.07 0.03 -0.09 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 
Portugal -0.08 0.07 -0.02 0.05 0.08 0.24 0.09 -0.14 0.11 0.07 0.13 0.04 
Pakistan -0.09 0.12 0.06 0.13 -0.10 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.22 -0.02 0.09 
Finland 0.07 0.07 0.16 0.10 -0.05 0.26 0.15 0.20 0.26 0.18 0.28 0.06 
Average 0.00 0.12 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.13 0.14 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.06 
% Sig. Corr. 17% 29% 17% 17% 4% 71% 58% 0% 33% 38% 29% 13% 
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Mexico 1.00             
Netherlands 0.08 1.00            
Greece 0.04 0.13 1.00           
Belgium 0.04 0.09 0.09 1.00          
Sri Lanka 0.03 0.21 0.30 0.14 1.00         
Israel 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.14 1.00        
S. Africa 0.22 0.31 0.23 0.15 0.24 0.03 1.00       
Chile 0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.09 0.04 0.13 0.05 1.00      
Malaysia 0.11 0.15 0.18 0.24 0.19 0.21 0.14 0.10 1.00     
Egypt -0.08 -0.02 0.07 -0.03 0.06 -0.02 -0.07 0.04 0.11 1.00    
Portugal 0.01 0.12 0.08 0.15 0.17 0.13 0.24 0.11 0.22 0.06 1.00   
Pakistan 0.29 -0.12 -0.01 0.13 -0.08 0.05 0.16 0.23 0.07 -0.02 0.00 1.00  
Finland 0.10 0.29 0.15 0.15 0.22 0.19 0.27 0.11 0.07 -0.08 0.14 0.18 1.00 
Average 0.00 0.12 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.13 0.14 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.09 
% Sig. Corr. 17% 29% 17% 17% 4% 71% 58% 0% 33% 38% 29% 13% 21% 
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Table 2 - Continued 
Panel B: This table reports the pairwise correlation coefficients of liquidity commonality measure (𝑅𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑
2 ) between countries in the high oil sensitive and 
low oil sensitive groups. Bold font refers to a statistical significance at the 1 % level. 
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Poland -0.11 0.28 0.02 0.08 -0.17 0.16 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.22 0.10 0.07 
Sweden -0.15 0.09 0.12 0.19 -0.10 0.33 0.14 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.16 
Spain -0.08 0.21 0.17 0.16 -0.04 0.11 0.19 0.20 0.08 0.17 0.01 0.11 
Turkey 0.19 0.16 0.29 0.07 0.13 0.04 0.20 0.32 0.01 0.04 -0.11 -0.05 
Italy -0.02 0.18 0.02 0.12 -0.15 0.13 0.15 -0.11 0.14 0.21 0.06 0.04 
Japan 0.17 0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.08 0.04 0.05 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.00 0.12 
China -0.14 0.00 0.19 0.10 0.05 0.12 0.14 0.00 0.06 0.20 0.04 0.18 
Peru -0.03 -0.08 0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.08 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.06 -0.09 
Argentina 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.15 0.02 0.20 0.12 0.18 0.05 0.07 
USA -0.07 -0.09 0.15 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.18 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.14 
Canada -0.11 0.07 0.20 0.23 0.18 0.15 0.06 0.15 0.02 0.17 0.03 -0.05 
France 0.11 0.10 0.08 -0.04 -0.27 0.32 0.27 0.12 0.10 0.25 0.10 0.08 
Germany 0.12 0.15 0.11 0.09 -0.14 0.25 0.17 0.01 0.22 0.20 0.09 0.07 
Indonesia 0.06 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.14 0.10 0.16 0.00 0.11 0.04 0.05 0.19 
New Zealand -0.22 0.04 -0.01 -0.07 -0.15 0.29 0.22 0.23 0.03 0.14 0.15 0.15 
Austria -0.12 0.17 -0.04 -0.14 -0.05 0.20 0.00 -0.11 0.31 0.12 0.20 0.16 
Denmark -0.04 0.11 0.02 0.03 -0.28 0.34 0.15 -0.11 0.21 0.08 0.29 0.06 
Bangladesh -0.07 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.11 0.10 -0.22 -0.01 -0.10 0.00 
Ireland 0.01 0.01 0.08 -0.24 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.42 0.10 0.14 0.04 0.03 
Switzerland -0.08 0.10 0.16 0.12 -0.07 0.29 0.09 -0.11 0.21 0.21 0.14 0.05 
Australia -0.09 0.07 -0.01 -0.02 -0.13 0.22 0.14 0.26 0.21 0.15 0.20 0.01 
Brazil -0.06 0.06 0.16 -0.03 0.29 0.12 0.22 -0.07 0.11 0.28 0.08 0.21 
UK -0.02 0.10 0.16 0.05 0.09 0.27 0.07 0.21 0.20 0.15 0.16 0.14 
Taiwan -0.07 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.21 0.05 0.23 -0.06 0.11 0.16 -0.10 0.10 
Hong Kong -0.13 0.16 -0.07 0.06 -0.24 0.19 0.41 0.03 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.06 
Average -0.04 0.09 0.08 0.04 -0.04 0.15 0.14 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.07 0.08 
% Sig. Corr. 4% 8% 4% 0% 0% 40% 28% 4% 28% 40% 16% 12% 
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Poland 0.03 0.15 0.05 0.23 0.25 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.15 0.11 0.15 0.16 0.30 
Sweden 0.19 0.28 0.15 0.22 0.20 0.16 0.34 0.15 0.17 -0.07 0.17 0.15 0.30 
Spain -0.01 0.08 -0.02 0.66 0.29 0.11 0.18 0.05 0.14 0.03 0.14 0.12 0.08 
Turkey -0.01 0.18 -0.16 0.01 -0.04 0.22 -0.01 -0.04 0.18 0.01 -0.07 0.03 0.05 
Italy 0.10 0.17 0.26 0.17 -0.02 0.07 0.37 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.33 0.11 0.17 
Japan 0.13 0.07 0.00 0.17 -0.10 -0.05 0.13 -0.02 0.13 -0.03 0.06 0.11 0.11 
China 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.14 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.15 -0.06 0.07 0.11 0.13 
Peru 0.06 0.01 0.15 0.10 -0.10 0.05 0.05 -0.02 0.16 0.11 0.03 0.04 -0.12 
Argentina 0.04 0.15 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.12 -0.03 0.05 0.00 0.10 
USA 0.18 0.08 -0.12 0.04 0.16 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 0.01 0.11 -0.06 0.07 -0.04 
Canada 0.29 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.20 0.21 0.15 0.10 0.12 0.25 0.31 
France 0.09 0.23 0.21 0.42 0.19 0.12 0.32 0.21 0.14 0.00 0.23 0.21 0.28 
Germany 0.19 0.22 0.13 0.31 0.26 0.20 0.36 0.08 0.26 -0.07 0.17 0.24 0.23 
Indonesia 0.20 0.12 0.16 0.44 0.09 0.06 0.15 0.14 0.22 0.08 0.18 0.27 0.18 
New Zealand 0.24 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.06 0.02 0.22 0.15 0.22 0.10 0.23 0.13 0.09 
Austria 0.07 0.30 0.19 0.20 0.08 -0.07 0.26 0.09 0.05 0.17 0.18 0.13 0.18 
Denmark 0.11 0.27 0.15 0.08 0.21 0.23 0.27 0.03 0.04 -0.12 0.21 0.11 0.48 
Bangladesh 0.08 -0.01 -0.06 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.04 0.12 0.13 0.27 0.08 -0.07 -0.16 
Ireland 0.15 0.06 0.18 0.17 -0.01 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.18 -0.05 0.02 0.11 0.13 
Switzerland 0.26 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.04 0.32 0.16 0.16 0.03 0.24 0.28 0.24 
Australia 0.18 0.13 0.19 0.15 0.17 0.05 0.18 0.06 0.10 0.00 0.20 0.17 0.35 
Brazil 0.03 0.11 0.19 0.12 0.11 0.22 0.08 0.15 0.25 0.03 0.18 0.12 0.11 
UK 0.17 0.32 0.23 0.12 0.15 0.08 0.40 0.05 0.05 -0.06 0.12 0.21 0.27 
Taiwan -0.10 0.09 0.23 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.09 0.11 0.26 0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.04 
Hong Kong 0.18 0.25 0.04 0.00 0.16 0.13 0.25 0.08 0.21 -0.04 0.21 0.11 0.20 
Average 0.12 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.11 0.08 0.18 0.08 0.15 0.03 0.13 0.13 0.16 
% Sig. Corr. 36% 36% 36% 32% 12% 8% 52% 8% 32% 4% 44% 28% 48% 
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commonality in the high oil sensitive countries share common factors (other than those 
commonly affect all countries) that make them co-move. These results are merely initial and we 
do not attempt to draw any conclusions out of them. Instead, we utilize a model specification that 
controls for other common factors, other than oil factors, that may explain variations in liquidity 
commonality across countries. Controlling relative explanatory variables of liquidity 
commonality is essential to investigate a robust effect of oil factors and crucial to avoid omitted 
variable biases. In the next section, we illustrate the estimation methodology and we outline the 
results. 
3. Regressions Analysis 
In this section, we introduce our model specification to investigate the over time effect of oil 
factors in explaining liquidity commonality across countries and show the results. In 3.1, we lay 
out the model and the estimation methodology. In 3.2, we present the results and discuss the 
findings.  
3.1. Estimation Methodology 
In light of the results from the correlation coefficients, presented in Table 2, and following 
Karolyi et al. (2012), we utilize the seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) to estimate the effect 
of oil factors on liquidity commonality. This approach is advantageous as it accounts for the 
potential correlations in residuals of liquidity commonality across countries as opposed to 
estimating the effect from OLS regressions, where we would assume the correlations between 
the residuals to be zero. The estimated structural equation model is as follows: 
𝑅𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑𝑐𝑡
2 = 𝛼𝑔 + 𝛽𝑔 𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑐𝑡  + 𝛾𝑔 𝑂𝑖𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑐𝑡 +  𝛿𝑔
′ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐𝑡 
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𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒:  𝐸[𝜀𝑐𝑡] = 0;  𝐸[𝜀𝑖𝑖′𝜀𝑖𝑗] = 0;   𝐸[𝜀𝑖𝑖′𝜀𝑖𝑖] = 𝜎𝑖
2;   𝐸[𝜀𝑖𝑖′𝜀𝑗𝑖] = 𝜎𝑖𝑗
2  
And, the subscript c represents the 50 country equations, t represents the month; the 
dependent variable 𝑅𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑
2  is transformed in the form: 𝑙𝑛 [
𝑅𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑
2
1−𝑅𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑
2 ]. The coefficients 𝛼𝑔, 𝛽𝑔, 
𝛾𝑔, 𝛿𝑔 are restricted to be equal in all equations in the group g. 
First, we estimate the model and restrict all coefficients to be the same in all countries in our 
sample. Since oil effect is hypothesized to play a more significant role in countries that are 
relatively more sensitive to the oil market, we allow the coefficients to change across two 
groups, high oil sensitive and low oil sensitive countries. In order to assure that the differences 
between the high and low oil sensitive countries are not driven by the inclusion of many major 
net exporters in the high oil sensitive group, we further relax the coefficients restrictions between 
net exporters and net importers and allow them to differ. In addition, this also would allow us to 
investigate whether the oil effect on liquidity commonality is asymmetric across net oil exporters 
and net oil importers, after controlling for oil sensitivity. To do so, we define three groups, 
namely low oil sensitive countries, high oil sensitive and net exporter countries, high oil sensitive 
and net importer countries, and allow the coefficients to be difference for each group. 
The latter test, however, may suffer from an endogenity problem.  Even though we control 
for oil sensitivity by restricting the countries of net exporters and net importers to be in 
withdrawn from the high oil sensitive classification, any asymmetric effect of oil factors on 
liquidity commonality can be attributed to the fact that net exporters are, on average, ranked 
more highly oil sensitive relative to net importers. In fact, the highest five oil sensitive countries 
in our sample are the net exporter members of OPEC. To address this issue and re-examine the 
asymmetric effect of oil factors on liquidity commonality in net exporters versus net importers, 
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we further split the countries into 4 groups, namely low oil sensitive countries, high oil sensitive 
OPEC net exporter countries, high oil sensitive non-OPEC net exporter and high oil sensitive net 
importer.  
3.2. Results 
In Table 3, we show the results from the seemingly unrelated regressions where we restrict 
the coefficients to be equal across all countries. In Model 1, 3, 5 and 7, we show the results from 
the inclusions of different sets of control variables but the oil factors. Particularly, in Model 1, 3 
and 5, respectively, we only include market condition variables, we include market condition and 
supply factors, we include market condition and demand factors and we include market condition 
variables, supply factors and demand factors. Conversely, in Model 2, 4, 6 and 8, we include oil 
factors in the equations. Consistent with Karolyi et al. (2012), we find that liquidity commonality 
decreases in market returns, time, capital market openness-proxied by the gross capital flow 
scaled GDP-and U.S. sentiment while increases in market volatility, market turnover, credit 
constaints-proxies by local short term interest rate-and turnover commonality (𝑅𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟
2 ). All 
these effects are statistically significant and have the expected signs.  
More importantly, the coefficients of oil factors, namely Oil Return and Oil Volatility have 
the expected signs but are statistically insignificant. Intuitively, the results from Table 3 indicate 
that a zero effect of oil factors in explaining liquidity commonality across countries cannot be 
rejected. To test the explaining power of oil factors and whether it captures the variations in 
liquidity commonality that are not captured by the control variables, we report the adjusted 𝑅2 
from separate OLS regression for each country and compare the means and medians of the 
model that does not include oil factors with the one that include them. The adjusted 𝑅2 without  
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Table 3: SUR regressions of liquidity commonality on commonality sources  
This table reports the results from seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) of 50 equations, representing the number of countries in our sample. All equations 
are jointly estimated for the period Jan 1995 to Dec 2015. In each model, we restrict the coefficients to be equal across all equations. The dependent variable 
is a log transformed form of the liquidity commonality measure, 𝑅𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑
2 . Full definitions of all variables are presented in Table A1 in Appendix A. Mean 
and Medians of Adjusted 𝑅2 reported in the last two rows are taken from separate OLS regressions of all countries. ***, **, * and ˆ refer to 1%, 5%, 10%, 
and one-sided statistical levels, respectively. 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
A. Market Conditions         
Market Return -0.0291 -0.0273 -0.0644ˆ -0.0627ˆ -0.0871** -0.0850** -0.0793* -0.0780* 
 (0.5000) (0.5282) (0.1309) (0.1431) (0.0411) (0.0474) (0.0618) (0.0672) 
Market Volatility 0.4773*** 0.4705*** 0.3940*** 0.3834*** 0.3703*** 0.3658*** 0.3275*** 0.3223*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Market Liquidity -0.0003ˆ -0.0003ˆ -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0004** -0.0004** -0.0002 -0.0002 
 (0.1019) (0.1098) (0.2413) (0.2686) (0.0329) (0.0362) (0.2234) (0.2416) 
Market Turnover 12.8891*** 12.8923*** 13.8914*** 13.8675*** 12.8632*** 12.8721*** 13.5198*** 13.5136*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Time Trend -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
B. Supply Factors                 
Short-term Interest Rate     0.0045*** 0.0044***     0.0043*** 0.0042*** 
     (0.0000) (0.0000)   (0.0000) (0.0000) 
U.S. Commercial Paper     -0.0095ˆ -0.0109*     -0.0055 -0.0067 
     (0.1335) (0.0874)    (0.3217) (0.2365) 
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Table 3 - Continued 
C. Demand Factors                 
𝑅𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟
2          0.1376*** 0.1367*** 0.1383*** 0.1373*** 
         (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Net % Equity Flow         0.0156ˆ 0.0155ˆ 0.0102 0.0103 
         (0.1544) (0.1560) (0.3497) (0.3434) 
Gross Capital Flow/GDP         -0.3618*** -0.3608*** -0.2915*** -0.2906*** 
         (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Exchange rate         -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0008 
         (0.3697) (0.3529) (0.2029) (0.1938) 
U.S. sentiment index         -0.0117** -0.0112* -0.0135** -0.0128** 
         (0.0396) (0.0533) (0.0175) (0.0270) 
D. Oil Factors                 
Oil Return   -0.0432   -0.0576ˆ   -0.0396   -0.0403 
   (0.3390)   (0.1988)   (0.3285)   (0.3250) 
Oil Volatility   1.1152   1.7765ˆ   0.8720   1.1969 
   (0.3379)   (0.1183)   (0.4008)   (0.2501) 
                 
                 
Intercept -1.3153*** -1.3206*** -1.3533*** -1.3626*** -1.2995*** -1.3045*** -1.3354*** -1.3422*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
                 
# Obs. 10681 10681 10050 10050 10000 10000 9902 9902 
Adjusted 𝑹𝟐 
Mean 10.98% 11.34% 11.23% 11.84% 15.32% 15.51% 16.31% 16.63% 
Median 5.86% 6.53% 5.36% 6.86% 12.98% 13.28% 13.83% 14.15% 
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oil factors is 16.31% and it increases to 16.63% when we include oil factors, indicating less 
than 2% increase. 
Essentially, we expect the oil factors to explain commonality in liquidity in countries that are 
somehow more integrated to the oil market. Therefore, we allow the coefficients to vary across 
two groups, namely high oil sensitive and low oil sensitive groups. Table 4 reports the results 
from seemingly unrelated regressions where we restrict the coefficients to be equal within each 
group and vary across groups. Model 1A and 1B include all control variables but oil factors 
whereas Model 2A and 2B include oil factors as well. Similarly, we report the mean and median 
of 𝑅2 of separate regressions for each country. In addition, we report the Wald test for the 
difference between the coefficients in the two groups. Interestingly, the coefficient of oil 
volatility is positive and statistically significant at the 1% statistical level for high oil sensitive 
group. On the other hand, the coefficient of oil volatility is negative and highly statistically 
insignificant for the low oil sensitive group. This difference in the effect of oil volatility in the 
two groups is highly statistically significant. For oil return, the coefficient is negative and only 
statistically significant for the high oil sensitive group in the one-sided test. However, the 
difference of oil return effect on high oil sensitive group versus low oil sensitive group is 
statistically insignificant.  
Clearly, oil factors, and in particular oil volatility, contributes to explain liquidity 
commonality only in countries that are more highly oil sensitive. This evidence is supported by 
two other aspects. First, we see that, for high oil sensitive countries, when we include oil factors 
in the separate OLS regressions, the means and medians of adjusted 𝑅2 increases 4.2% and 
4.6%, respectively. On the other hand, for low oil sensitive countries, the improvement in 
adjusted 𝑅2 is close to zero to less than 1%. Second, we compare the intercept of the models, for  
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Table 4: SUR regressions of liquidity commonality on commonality sources-high and low oil sensitive 
groups  
This table reports the results from seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) of 50 equations, representing the number 
of countries in our sample. All equations are jointly estimated for the period Jan 1995 to Dec 2015. In each 
model, we restrict the coefficients to be equal within each group but vary across two groups. The first group 
includes high oil sensitive countries (countries whose oil sensitivity ratio is above the median of all countries) and 
the second includes low oil sensitive countries (countries whose oil sensitivity ratio is below the median of all 
countries). The dependent variable is a log transformed form of the liquidity commonality measure, 𝑅𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑
2 . Full 
definitions of all variables are presented in Table A1 in Appendix A. Mean and Medians of Adjusted 𝑅2 reported 
in the last two rows are taken from separate OLS regressions of all countries. In the last two columns, Wald test is 
reported for the difference in the coefficients between groups. ***, **, * and ˆ refer to 1%, 5%, 10%, and one-
sided statistical levels, respectively. 
Group High Oil Sensitive Low Oil Sensitives Wald Test 
Model (1A) (2A) (1B) (2B) (1A) - (1B) (2A) - (2B) 
E. Market Conditions       
Market Return 0.0907* 0.0892* -0.2900*** -0.2787*** 0.3807*** 0.3679*** 
 (0.0713) (0.0767) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Market Volatility 0.5977*** 0.5496*** 0.2242*** 0.2340*** 0.3736*** 0.3155*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) 
Market Liquidity 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0016*** -0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0020*** 
 (0.4628) (0.4532) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
Market Turnover -4.9297*** -4.9242*** 28.0313*** 28.2520*** -32.96*** -33.18*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Time Trend -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3708) (0.3470) 
F. Supply Factors       
Short-term Interest Rate 0.0007 0.0007 0.0057*** 0.0057*** -0.0050*** -0.0050*** 
 (0.3813) (0.3833) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
U.S. Commercial Paper 0.0014 -0.0002 -0.0135** -0.0140** 0.0149*** 0.0138** 
 (0.8208) (0.9760) (0.0328) (0.0290) (0.0077) (0.0120) 
G. Demand Factors       
𝑅𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟
2  0.1493*** 0.1460*** 0.1204*** 0.1215*** 0.0289* 0.0244ˆ 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0945) (0.1597) 
Net % Equity Flow 0.0017 0.0041 0.0288ˆ 0.0271ˆ -0.0271 -0.0230 
 (0.8961) (0.7600) (0.1148) (0.1394) (0.2270) (0.3055) 
Gross Capital Flow/GDP -0.4573*** -0.4594*** -0.2393*** -0.2402*** -0.2180** -0.2192** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0123) (0.0117) 
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each group, that does not include oil factors with the one that does. Before controlling for oil 
factors, the intercepts of high and low oil sensitive groups are economically and statistically 
different from each other at the 1% statistical level. However, when we control for oil factors, 
this difference shrinks to half and now it is statistically insignificant. This indicates that oil 
factors capture the variations between the average liquidity commonality across the two groups, 
which in turn emphasizes the importance of oil factors in explaining liquidity commonality 
variations in the high oil sensitive group. 
Table 5 shows the results from the test of an asymmetric effect of oil factors on net oil 
exporters versus net oil importers. In Model 1A and 2A, we report the coefficients of the 
regressions that are restricted to be equal within the high oil sensitive and net exporter countries,  
Table 4 - Continued 
Exchange rate -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0008 0.0005 0.0005 
 (0.7303) (0.7216) (0.2776) (0.2751) (0.7227) (0.7249) 
U.S. sentiment index -0.0094ˆ -0.0078 -0.0130** -0.0131** 0.0036 0.0052 
 (0.1416) (0.2264) (0.0405) (0.0439) (0.5214) (0.3466) 
H. Oil Factors       
Oil Return  -0.0661ˆ  -0.0162  -0.0499 
  (0.1463)  (0.7257)  (0.2193) 
Oil Volatility  3.3070***  -0.9784  4.2854*** 
  (0.0039)  (0.4085)  (0.0000) 
           
           
Intercept -1.3016*** -1.3201*** -1.3497*** -1.3426*** 0.0480*** 0.0225ˆ 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0008) (0.1488) 
           
Total System Obs. 9902 9902 9902 9902   
# Countries 25 25 25 25   
Adjusted 𝑹𝟐 
Mean 15.27% 15.91% 17.35% 17.36%   
Median 12.04% 12.59% 14.29% 14.40%   
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Table 5: SUR regressions of liquidity commonality on commonality sources-net exporters and net 
importers  
This table reports the results from seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) of 50 equations, representing the 
number of countries in our sample. All equations are jointly estimated for the period Jan 1995 to Dec 2015. In 
each model, we restrict the coefficients to be equal within each group but vary across three groups. The first 
group includes high oil sensitive and net exporter countries (countries whose oil sensitivity ratio is above the 
median of all countries and that are net exporters), the second includes high oil sensitive and net importer 
countries (countries whose oil sensitivity ratio is above the median of all countries and that are net importers) and 
the third includes low oil sensitive countries (countries whose oil sensitivity ratio is below the median of all 
countries). The third group results are suppressed since they are presented in Table 4. The dependent variable is a 
log transformed form of the liquidity commonality measure, 𝑅𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑
2 . Full definitions of all variables are 
presented in Table A1 in Appendix A. In the last two columns, Wald test is reported for the difference in the 
coefficients between groups. ***, **, * and ˆ refer to 1%, 5%, 10%, and one-sided statistical levels, respectively.  
Group High Oil Sens./Net Exporter High Oil Sens./Net Importer Wald Test 
 (A) (B) (A) - (B) 
I. Market Conditions    
Market Return -0.1503ˆ 0.1468*** -0.2971*** 
 (0.1535) (0.0076) (0.0100) 
Market Volatility 0.4248*** 0.4549*** -0.0300 
 (0.0022) (0.0000) (0.8506) 
Market Liquidity 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0005 
 (0.2696) (0.5990) (0.2863) 
Market Turnover 42.2573*** -7.5691*** 49.8263*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Time Trend -0.0002* -0.0004*** 0.0002ˆ 
 (0.0545) (0.0000) (0.1099) 
J. Supply Factors    
Short-term Interest Rate -0.0007 0.0026*** -0.0033** 
 (0.6087) (0.0026) (0.0335) 
U.S. Commercial Paper -0.0183* 0.0010 -0.0193* 
 (0.0799) (0.8729) (0.0576) 
K. Demand Factors    
𝑅𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟
2  0.2070*** 0.1383*** 0.0687** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0399) 
Net % Equity Flow 0.0472 0.0017 0.0455 
 (0.2178) (0.9068) (0.2653) 
Gross Capital Flow/GDP -6.6289*** 0.0609 -6.6898*** 
 (0.0000) (0.4960) (0.0000) 
Exchange rate -0.0038ˆ 0.0004 -0.0041ˆ 
 (0.1233) (0.7547) (0.1217) 
U.S. sentiment index 0.0007 -0.0114* 0.0121 
 (0.9504) (0.0830) (0.2748) 
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which includes 10 countries. In Model 1B and 2B, we report the coefficients of the regressions 
that are restricted to be equal within the high oil sensitive and net importer countries, which 
includes 15 countries. As anticipated, the effect of oil return is economically and statistically 
stronger in the high oil sensitive and net exporter countries. The coefficient of oil return is -
0.145, statistically significant at 10% level, in the high oil sensitive and net exporter group while 
it is -0.056, statistically insignificant, in the low oil sensitive and net importer group. However, 
based on Wald test, this difference is statistically insignificant. On the other hand, the coefficient 
of oil volatility in the high oil sensitive and net exporter group (6.75) is more than double the 
coefficient in the low oil sensitive and net importer group (2.87). This difference is statistically 
significant at the 5% statistical level. Overall, the results suggest that the liquidity commonality 
in net exporters are more influenced by oil factors than net importers, after controlling for oil 
sensitivity. 
Table 5 - Continued 
L. Oil Factors    
Oil Return -0.1452* -0.0560 -0.0892 
 (0.0632) (0.2294) (0.2429) 
Oil Volatility 6.7453*** 2.8678** 3.8776** 
 (0.0004) (0.0154) (0.0409) 
    
    
Intercept -1.3128*** -1.3336*** 0.0208 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5059) 
      
Total System Obs. 9902 9902  
# Countries 10 15  
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Nevertheless, as we point out in the previous section, the latter test may suffer from an 
endogenity problem. This endogenity rises from the fact that we consider a country to be high oil 
sensitive if only its oil sensitivity ratio is higher than the median and we ignore the fact that 
countries in the high sensitivity group are not equally sensitive to the oil market. Arguably, the 
results from Table 4 could be influenced by the possibility that net exporters are more highly oil 
sensitive than net importers. In fact, as pointed out, the highest five oil sensitive countries in our 
sample are the net exporter members of OPEC. To address this issue, we further split the 
countries into 4 groups, low oil sensitive, high oil sensitive and OPEC members, high oil 
sensitive non-OPEC net exporters and high oil sensitive and net importers groups. Table 6 
reports the results from the seemingly unrelated regressions where we restrict the coefficients to 
be the same within each group and vary across the 4 groups. Interestingly, the effect of oil return 
is much more economically and statistically significant for the high oil sensitive and OPEC 
members, with a coefficient of -0.3517, compared to the other groups, where this effect shows no 
statistical significance. The difference of this effect is statistically significant when compared 
with non-OPEC net exporters or net importers. This suggests that the liquidity commonality in 
OPEC members, as major oil exporters, is not only affected by oil volatility but also is highly 
influenced by oil price expected movements. For oil volatility, both net exporters groups show 
higher impact on liquidity commonality compared to net importers. The coefficient of oil 
volatility in non-OPEC net exporters is 7.33 compared to 2.76 in net importers, which are both 
statistically significant. This difference is statistically significant based on Wald test. These 
results confirm our initial findings of the asymmetric effect of oil factors on commonality 
liquidity in oil net exporters and oil net importers and verify that our findings are not influenced 
by the inclusion of OPEC members in the oil net exporter group.
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Table 6: SUR regressions of liquidity commonality on commonality sources-OPEC, non-OPEC net exporters and net importers  
This table reports the results from seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) of 50 equations, representing the number of countries in our sample. All equations are 
jointly estimated for the period Jan 1995 to Dec 2015. In each model, we restrict the coefficients to be equal within each group but vary across four groups. The 
first group includes high oil sensitive and OPEC net exporter countries (countries whose oil sensitivity ratio is above the median of all countries and that are 
OPEC net exporters), The first group includes high oil sensitive and OPEC net exporter countries (countries whose oil sensitivity ratio is above the median of all 
countries and that are OPEC net exporters), The second group includes high oil sensitive and non-OPEC net exporter countries (countries whose oil sensitivity 
ratio is above the median of all countries and that are non-OPEC net exporters), the third group includes high oil sensitive and net importer countries (countries 
whose oil sensitivity ratio is above the median of all countries and that are net importers) and the fourth group includes low oil sensitive countries (countries 
whose oil sensitivity ratio is below the median of all countries). The fourth group results are suppressed since they are presented in Table 4. The dependent 
variable is a log transformed form of the liquidity commonality measure, 𝑅𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑
2 . Full definitions of all variables are presented in Table A1 in Appendix A. Wald 
test is reported for the difference in the coefficients between groups. ***, **, * and ˆ refer to 1%, 5%, 10%, and one-sided statistical levels, respectively.  
Group High Oil Sens./ 
OPEC 
High Oil Sens./ 
Net Exp.(non-
OPEC) 
High Oil Sens./ 
Net Importer 
Wald Tests 
Model (1) (2) (3) (1) - (2) (1) - (3) (2) – (3) 
A. Market Conditions       
Market Return -0.6325*** 0.3400** 0.1535*** -0.9724*** -0.7859*** 0.1865 
 (0.0001) (0.0166) (0.0053) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2054) 
Market Volatility -0.0001 0.7636*** 0.4588*** -0.7638*** -0.4590* 0.3048ˆ 
 (0.9995) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0068) (0.0525) (0.1089) 
Market Liquidity 0.0001 -0.0058 -0.0002 0.0059ˆ 0.0003 -0.0056 
 (0.6785) (0.2075) (0.5961) (0.1991) (0.5047) (0.2254) 
Market Turnover 73.8709*** 7.0972 -7.7031*** 66.7737*** 81.5740*** 14.8003* 
 (0.0000) (0.4151) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0980) 
Time Trend -0.0004ˆ -0.0004** -0.0005*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
 (0.1734) (0.0220) (0.0000) (0.8886) (0.8831) (0.5495) 
B. Supply Factors       
Short-term Interest Rate 0.0036ˆ -0.0013 0.0025*** 0.0049ˆ 0.0011 -0.0038* 
 (0.1524) (0.4820) (0.0037) (0.1192) (0.6864) (0.0513) 
U.S. Commercial Paper -0.0169 -0.0182ˆ 0.0010 0.0013 -0.0180 -0.0193* 
 (0.3295) (0.1477) (0.8743) (0.9500) (0.3196) (0.0956) 
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Table 6 - Continued 
C. Demand Factors       
𝑅𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟
2  0.3335*** 0.1099*** 0.1388*** 0.2235*** 0.1946*** -0.0289 
 (0.0000) (0.0047) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.4801) 
Net % Equity Flow  0.0444 0.0010   0.0434 
  (0.2369) (0.9452)   (0.2791) 
Gross Capital Flow/GDP  -3.1078*** 0.0448   -3.1526*** 
  (0.0032) (0.6179)   (0.0029) 
Exchange rate -0.0118** 0.0010 0.0003 -0.0128** -0.0121** 0.0007 
 (0.0454) (0.7044) (0.7854) (0.0472) (0.0433) (0.8082) 
U.S. sentiment index -0.0335ˆ 0.0077 -0.0102ˆ -0.0412* -0.0233 0.0179ˆ 
 (0.1251) (0.5607) (0.1208) (0.0917) (0.2973) (0.1376) 
D. Oil Factors       
Oil Return -0.3517*** 0.0041 -0.0450 -0.3558** -0.3067** 0.0491 
 (0.0090) (0.9652) (0.3393) (0.0247) (0.0276) (0.5691) 
Oil Volatility 5.4398* 7.3277*** 2.7569** -1.8879 2.6829 4.5708** 
 (0.0929) (0.0021) (0.0214) (0.6294) (0.4261) (0.0391) 
       
Intercept -1.2780*** -1.3338*** -1.3320*** 0.0558 0.0541 -0.0017 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.4834) (0.4650) (0.9607) 
       
Total System Obs. 9902 9902 9902    
# Countries 5 5 15    
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3.3. Robustness Check 
Because of the lack of the theoretical basis for the link between oil factors and stock 
liquidity, one may argue that the empirical findings in this paper might possibly be driven by the 
potential high correlations between oil factors and market factors. It has been evident by many 
recent studies, discussed here and including this study, that market factors play a statistically and 
economically significant role in liquidity commonality in equity markets. Therefore, one may 
suspect that the conclusions driven about the role of oil factors on liquidity commonality are 
merely a result of a multicollinearity issue. To address this issue, we simply use oil factors that 
are orthogonal to market factors in the regressions. Specifically, oil factors are orthogonalized by 
taking the residuals from the regressions of oil factors on market factors. 
Table 7: Orthogonality Test  
This table reports the results from the inclusion of orthogonal oil factors in the seemingly unrelated regressions 
(SUR). Oil factors are orthogonalized by taking the residuals from the regressions of oil factors on market factors. 
Panel A validates the results presented in Table 3. Panel B validates the results presented in Table 4. Panel C 
validates the results presented in Table 5. Panel D validates the results presented in Table 6. ***, **, * and ˆ refer 
to 1%, 5%, 10%, one-sided statistical levels, respectively. 
Panel A     
Group All Countries All Countries All Countries All Countries 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Oil Return -0.0623^ -0.0770* -0.0559^ -0.0566^ 
 (0.1645) (0.0831) (0.1656) (0.1639) 
Oil Volatility -0.6209 0.3918 -0.1385 0.2148 
 (0.5843) (0.7222) (0.8920) (0.8327) 
Market Conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Supply Factors NO Yes No Yes 
Demand Factors NO No Yes Yes 
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Table 7 - Continued 
Panel B     
Group High Oil Sensitive Low Oil Sensitive Wald Test  
Model (1) (2) (1)-(2)  
Oil Return -0.0799* -0.0282 -0.0517  
 (0.0786) (0.5388) (0.2034)  
Oil Volatility 2.4771** -1.4479 3.9250***  
 (0.0279) (0.2138) (0.0002)  
Market Conditions Yes Yes   
Supply Factors Yes Yes   
Demand Factors Yes Yes   
     
Panel C     
Group High Oil Sens./Net 
Exporter 
High Oil Sens./Net 
Importer 
Wald Test  
Model (1) (2) (1)-(2)  
Oil Return -0.1505* -0.0780* -0.0725  
 (0.0544) (0.0938) (0.3436)  
Oil Volatility 6.3837*** 2.2280* 4.1557**  
 (0.0009) (0.0563) (0.0308)  
Market Conditions Yes Yes   
Supply Factors Yes Yes   
Demand Factors Yes Yes   
     
Panel D     
Group High Oil 
Sens./ 
OPEC 
High Oil 
Sens./ 
Net Exp.(non-
OPEC) 
High Oil 
Sens./ 
Net 
Importer 
Wald Test 
Model (1) (2) (3) (1) - (2) (1) - (3) (2) – (3) 
Oil Return -0.3589*** -0.0143 -0.0696^ -0.3445** -0.2893** 0.0553 
 (0.0079) (0.8773) (0.1389) (0.0297) (0.0381) (0.5208) 
Oil Volatility 4.4389^ 6.5319*** 2.0343* 2.0930 2.4046 4.4975** 
 (0.1732) (0.0063) (0.0844) (0.5963) (0.4791) (0.0456) 
Market Conditions Yes Yes Yes  
Supply Factors Yes Yes Yes  
Demand Factors Yes Yes Yes  
44 
 
In Table 7, we report the results from all our analyses using orthogonal oil factors. Panel A, 
B, C and D validate the results presented in Table 3, 4, 5 and 6, respectively. Generally, the 
results from Table 7 produce qualitatively similar results and confirm our empirical findings. 
4. Conclusion 
Previous studies have documented the commonality in equity market liquidity across the 
world. More recently, extensive research has shed some light on what might explain why equity 
market liquidity co-moves. In this study, we introduce oil market, which we hypothesize to help 
directly and/or indirectly explain commonality in liquidity, especially and largely in certain 
economies that are integrated with and sensitive to oil market. We use a sample of 36,930 firms 
from 50 countries and show that the transmitting channels of oil factors, namely oil returns and 
volatility only explain variations in liquidity commonality for countries that are somehow more 
oil sensitive. We define oil sensitivity as the absolute value of the difference of exports and 
imports scaled by the country’s GDP. Specifically, we show that oil volatility effect on liquidity 
commonality is more substantial than oil return effect, when we restrict the coefficients of its 
effect to be equal for all countries that are considered high oil sensitive. In addition, we show 
that oil volatility effect is more pronounced in net oil exporters as opposed to net oil importers, 
after controlling for oil sensitivity.  
The asymmetric effect of oil factors in net oil exporters and net oil importers is re-examined 
by allowing the coefficients to vary across OPEC members and non-OPEC net exporter 
members. The findings suggest that oil returns influence liquidity commonality in only OPEC 
members whereas oil volatility influence liquidity commonality in both net oil exporters groups 
along with net oil importers. Lastly, we confirm the results that suggest a more pronounced 
45 
 
effect of oil volatility on net oil exporters as opposed to net oil importers. Our results are robust 
to controlling for possible sources of liquidity commonality suggested in the literature.  
The implications of the findings can be summarized into two aspects. First, the establishment 
of a statistical association between oil market and liquidity commonality in equity markets help 
anticipate and mitigate the negative impact of a contagious shock in liquidity in the equity 
markets, especially in economies that are highly integrated with oil markets. For investors, our 
findings also have a vital implication as it suggests a causality effect of oil factors on the price of 
liquidity risk, which increases in the level of liquidity commonality. For future research, we 
recommend to study the effects of oil shocks on commonality in liquidity by separating the 
sources of shocks and its directions. Killian (2009) study the dynamic effect of oil shocks on a 
set of economic factors and find that the effect of oil shocks is asymmetric in terms of whether 
they are driven by demand or supply sources. Possible research questions can be: whether the 
effects of different sources of oil shocks on liquidity commonality are asymmetric? And, whether 
positive shocks and negative shocks effect on commonality in liquidity differ? Answers to 
similar questions are highly important to anticipate and mitigate or limit the risk of contagious 
sudden dry-up in the equity markets, accelerated by the high levels of commonality in liquidity. 
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Chapter Two 
Corporate Future Investments and Stock Liquidity: Evidence from Emerging 
Markets 
 
1. Introduction 
One essential factor that affects firms’ investment growth is the rate of the cost of capital. 
Since capital consists of debt and/or equity, the cost of capital can be defined as the weighted 
average of the required rate of return on equity and the cost of debt. Intuitively, firms assess their 
future projects using this rate to determine the set of positive NPV projects that are available to 
undertake. The seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) shows that, in the presence of 
uncertainty, the market value of a firm is determined by the risk of the assets it holds. Therefore, 
firms evaluate their future assets, purchases and investments by estimating the risk involved. One 
critical issue is how to determine the risks involved in estimating the cost of capital. Many asset 
pricing theories have been modelled and developed to identify factors that are involved in pricing 
equities. In earlier work, Jack Treynor (1961), William F. Sharpe (1964), John Lintner (1965) 
and  Fischer Black (1972) independently introduce and develop the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM). In their model, they price securities, or determine the cost of equities, based on their 
exposures to the market as a single systematic risk factor that investors cannot diversify away 
from thus be compensated for.  
Many studies have investigated the validity of CAPM and have proposed risk factors that are 
claimed to explain stock returns more accurately. Recently, the influential work of Fama and 
French (1992) introduce a three-factor model, and this shows that the model, which accounts for 
risks related to size and market-to-book ratio, better explains the variations in stock returns. In 
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addition, a major price factor examined in the literature is the liquidity effect, which is examined 
empirically (i.e. Amihud, 2002; Chordia et al., 2001, Jones, 2002, Bekaert et al., 2007, Pastor 
and Stambaugh, 2003) as well as theoretically (i.e. Amihud and Mendelson, 1986, 
Constantinides, 1986,  Huang, 2003, Acharya and Pedersen, 2005). 
Stock liquidity can be defined as the flexibility to buy and sell stocks without experiencing a 
negative impact on price. Several methods for quantifying the liquidity of a stock have been 
proposed and analyzed in the literature. Bid-ask spread is argued to be a natural or an ideal proxy 
for liquidity costs (Amihud and Mandelson, 1986). However, due to the limitations in global 
data, many studies use proxies that only require daily frequency data, such as Amihud and 
Turnover (e.g. Amihud et al., 2015). Empirically, evidence suggests that stock liquidity has a 
negative effect on stock returns; when liquidity is low, shareholders demand higher returns to 
compensate for the risk of being unable to rapidly sell the stock at a relatively low cost.  
This liquidity effect is shown by Amihud and Mendelson (1986) to have a positive effect on 
market capitalization growth as well. They argue that when liquidity is high, the cost of capital 
will decrease, resulting in a lower discounting rate used to discount firms’ new investments. 
Therefore, this liquidity effect is predicted to have an impact on the future growth of a firm. 
Myer (1977) defines the value of a firm as the present value of assets already held, and the 
present value of future growth opportunities. The present value is calculated using, again, the 
cost of capital rate; therefore, when the cost of capital decreases as a result of an increase in 
liquidity, we should expect the future investment opportunity set to expand. In other words, some 
negative NPV projects will become positive after a decrease in the discount rate, which will 
enlarge the set of positive NPV projects that a firm is willing to undertake and will eventually 
undertake, holding the financial constraints constant.  
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The linkage between corporate decisions and stock market liquidity is an ongoing debate in 
the corporate finance literature. Concerning a payout policy, Banerjee et al. (2007) find that less 
liquid stocks are more likely to pay cash dividends to their shareholders. Their results suggest 
that the declining propensity of firms to pay dividends over time is related to the dramatic 
changes in the liquidity of the U.S. stock market. Consistent with this, Brockman et al. (2008) 
show that firms with higher liquidity are encouraged more towards the use of repurchases rather 
than cash dividends. Concerning capital structure, Lipson and Mortal (2009) argue that a 
reduction in the cost of equity encourages managers to use equity more so than debt. Their 
findings show a significant negative association between a firm’s leverage and stock liquidity. 
Similarly, Stulz et al. (2013) find evidence for an association between equity issuance and 
aggregate stock market liquidity; mainly, they show that firms are more likely to go public or 
offer new equity issues when aggregate market liquidity is high. With regard to corporate 
investment decisions, a handful of studies have examined the impact of stock liquidity on firms’ 
future investments and whether the reduction in cost of equity encourages investment growth at 
the microeconomic level. Later on, an extended discussion on this matter in the literature will be 
provided, as it is more related to this paper. 
In this paper, we study the impact of stock liquidity on firms’ future investments. We argue 
that, since the cost of equity is used by managers to discount the future cash flows of future 
investments, it is reasonable to expect that a reduction in the cost of equity caused by an increase 
in stock liquidity would eventually cause growth in future investments. In addition, we 
investigate whether this stock liquidity effect on future investments, if it holds, varies across 
firms with different levels of financial constraints. Since liquidity positively affects the cost of 
equity, a firm that is more financially constrained and has limited access to external capital 
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should be more sensitive to what affects the cost of equity, which in this case stock is liquidity. 
This argument is inspired by two recent studies that show how the level of financial constraints 
and development determine how much benefit a firm can gain from an increase in liquidity 
through U.S. cross listings (Lins et al., 2005; Hail and Leuz, 2009). Lins et al. (2005) show that 
the investment-cash sensitivity of non-U.S. firms is low after U.S. listings only for emerging 
markets, which tend to have less relaxed capital access. Similarly, Hail and Leuz (2009) find that 
firms with cross-listings on U.S. exchanges experience a decrease in their cost of capital, 
however there are smaller reductions for cross-listings in countries with stronger legal 
institutions, which tend to have less limited access to capital. Our two main hypotheses can be 
stated as: 
H1: Holding other factors constant, a firm’s future investments increase in its stock liquidity 
because of the reduction in the cost of equity. 
H2:  Holding other factors constant, the effect of stock liquidity on future investments is more 
pronounced in more financially constrained firms due to the limited access for other external 
capital. 
Very few studies in the literature have examined a similar research question. Butler et al. 
(2005) examine a U.S. sample of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) and found that the cost of 
issuing new equity is higher for most illiquid stocks as opposed to the most liquid stocks. 
Becker-Blease and Paul (2006), using a U.S. sample of firms and exploiting the additions in S&P 
500 as positive liquidity shock, show that stocks that are added to S&P 500 experience an 
increase in future investments, and describe how this increase is partially explained by the 
increase in stock liquidity. They use capital expenditures and other alternative measures to proxy 
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for future investments and Amihud, Volume and Turnover to proxy for stock liquidity. In 
addition, Baran and King (2012) present results consistent with those of Becker-Blease and Paul 
(2006) by explicitly examining the change in the cost of equity surrounding the index addition 
and deletions, as in Butler et al. (2005), instead of using future investments as the dependent 
variable, as in Becker-Blease and Paul (2006). In contrast, Gregoriou and Nguyen (2010) use a 
sample of UK firms and utilized deletions from the FTSE 100, a negative liquidity shock, and 
find that there is no effect of liquidity on future investments, using the same measures as in 
Becker-Blease and Paul (2006). They argue that firms should still be able to borrow at the same 
cost of capital even after the negative liquidity shock (i.e. being deleted from the FTSE 100). 
More recently, Muñoz (2013) uses a sample from Latin American countries, namely Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile and Mexico, to show that liquidity positively affects future investments. 
Furthermore, he shows that this effect is less pronounced in large size firms, higher book-to-
market firms, and is more pronounced for share issuer firms.  
We extend this line of studies and contribute towards the literature in two different ways. 
First, a common factor in the previous studies that investigate similar research questions, is that 
they use relatively small samples, which may impose some constraints on addressing the 
heterogeneity of the liquidity effect on future investments across firms. The number of firms 
included in previous studies that examine the relation between investment and liquidity ranges 
from 185 to 370 firms while the sample in this study covers more than 9800 firms. Such a large 
sample allows us to exhibit more variations in financial constraints across firms. Moreover, the 
samples used in previous studies are drawn from a single market or a region, which may not 
allow controlling for country effects. In addition, except for Muñoz (2013), previous studies base 
their findings on samples drawn from highly developed markets, namely the U.S. and the U.K., 
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where liquidity is arguably far less significant when compared to less developed markets. In fact, 
Bekaert et al. (2007) predict that any supportive evidence for a liquidity effect on a highly 
developed market could be attributed to an omitted variable correlated with the liquidity proxy. 
On the other hand, evidence against a liquidity effect cannot be generalized and used to rule out 
the possibility of the presence of liquidity effect in less developed markets. Bekaert et al. (2007) 
argue that a highly developed stock market such as the U.S. stock market tends to be very large 
in terms of trades, and to have an ownership structure that is highly diversified, combining long-
term investors, who are less subject to liquidity risk, with short-term investors. In fact, such 
characteristics are lacking in emerging markets, which makes them much more sensitive to 
liquidity effect. For this, we obtain a sample from 21 emerging markets from widely different 
regions. Another reason why we opt to draw our sample from firms operating in emerging 
markets is because we intend to examine the extent to which financial constraints influence the 
liquidity effect on future investments, and as such firms are expected to suffer more from 
financial constraints and arguably exhibit higher variations in their financial constraint levels. 
Second, we attempt to go one further step and shed light on the impact of financial 
constraints on the investment liquidity relation. We identify several determinants of financial 
constraints at the firm level, while we control for the country effects. Since stock liquidity is 
crucial in emerging markets, this has a vital implication for both firms’ managers and 
policymakers as it would enable them to understand more about how important market liquidity 
it is and when it is important the most for firms’ growth. 
Using a sample of more than 9800 firms, from 21 emerging markets and spanning from 2000 
to 2015, we find supportive and robust evidence of a positive association between stock liquidity 
and firms’ future investments. Furthermore, our findings strongly suggest that the liquidity effect 
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on corporate investments is highly influenced by firms’ financial constraint levels, using four 
different definitions of financial constraint. These results are robust due to controlling for other 
future investment determinants suggested in the previous literature, and due to controlling for the 
country and time effects. In addition, the results seem to be consistent with the use of alternative 
measures for corporate investment and stock liquidity and alternative model specifications. 
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows: In section two, the empirical 
methodology and model specifications are outlined.  In section three, the construction of the 
sample is described along with discussing some preliminary results. In section four, the empirical 
findings are presented, and finally, in section six, the main findings are highlighted with some 
concluding remarks offered. 
2. Methodology 
In this section, we outline the regression methodology that allows us to test our two main 
hypotheses. We set the main equations to be estimated, the estimation procedure used for both 
hypotheses and we identify the expected outcome of the results in accordance with the stated 
hypotheses. 
2.1. Corporate Investment and Stock Liquidity 
To test the sensitivity of corporate investments to stock liquidity, we follow the traditionally 
estimated investment equation (Fazzari et al., 1988; Hoshi et al. 1991; Lang et al., 1996; Lins et 
al., 2005 and others), however we adjust it to fit with the nature of our hypotheses. Particularly, 
we estimate the following equation: 
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𝐼𝑡+𝑗
𝐾𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 +  𝛽2  
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡+𝑗
𝑇𝐴𝑡
+ 𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 +  𝛽6 𝑞𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑡 (1) 
The dependent variable (I) is the firm’s capital expenditure at time t+1 or t+2 scaled by 
beginning period capital (K). Following Love (2003), we define capital (K) as the sum of net 
property, plant and equipment and depreciation minus capital expenditure. We use different 
future periods (j=1, 2) since investment may not be carried out immediately. Lins et al (2005) 
note that international firms are more likely to be consistent in reporting total assets than capital. 
For this, we use both capital and total assets in scaling the investment variable for robustness. 
Because the dependent variable is almost always between 0 and 1 and to make more suitable for 
a regression framework, we use the logistic transformation ln [𝑦/(1 − 𝑦)], where y is the 
dependent variable (Morck et al., 2000; Karolyi et al., 2012)7.  
Our key variable is Liquidity, which is a proxy for the firm’s stock liquidity. Due to data 
limitations, we use two proxies of liquidity that only require daily frequencies, namely Amihud 
and Turnover, following previous studies that employ international data (e.g. Karolyi et al., 
2012; Amihud et al., 2015). We include in the regressions the log value of the average from daily 
liquidity values for each firm-year. We expect the coefficient 𝛽1 to be positive in accordance 
with our first hypothesis that expects stock liquidity to increase future investments. Amihud is 
defined as: 
𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑𝑖,𝑑 = − log (1 +
|𝑅𝑖,𝑑|
𝑃𝑖,𝑑𝑉𝑂𝑖,𝑑
)       
                                                          
7 For robustness, we use the actual value of the dependent variable, though unreported, and the 
results are very similar. 
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 Where R is the daily return in U.S. dollars, P is the daily price converted to U.S. Dollars 
and VO is the daily volume. We add the constant one and take the log to avoid outliers 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Karolyi et al., 2012). In addition, we multiply the outcome with 
minus one to convert the measure to be increasing in liquidity thus comparable with Turnover.  
 Similarly, Turnover is defined as: 
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑑 = log (1 +
𝑉𝑂𝑖,𝑑
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑦
)  
 Where Shares is the annual number of shares outstanding.  
 To avoid an omitted variable bias, we identify several variables that shown in previous 
studies to capture some of corporate investment variations over time and in the cross sectional. 
One of the most important variables studied is cash flow (FCF). Farazzi et al. (1988) argue that 
firms’ corporate investment is positively related to their internal financing capability because 
external financing is costly. Many studies, including Farazzi et al. (1988), Hoshi et al. (1991), 
Lang et al. (1996), Lins et al. (2005) and others, find supportive evidence to this prediction. We 
define FCF as the sum of earnings before interest and tax and deprecation minus dividends at 
time t+1 or t+2. We scale this variable by the beginning period total assets. We expect the 
coefficient 𝛽2 to be positive consistent with the investment-cash sensitivity hypothesis.  
 In addition, we include Leverage and define it as total debt divided by total assets. The 
higher the leverage, the lower the debt capacity or the lower ability to raise capital when needed. 
Lang et al. (1996) and Hovakimian (2009) show negative relation between leverage and future 
investments. Therefore, we expect 𝛽3 to be negative.  
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 Hoshi et al. (1991) and Lins et al. (2005), among others, include sales in the corporate 
investment equation as a proxy for production. Hoshi et al. (1991) argue that sales could possibly 
be an accelerator effect for corporate investments. Firms are likely to invest more when their 
production strongly increases. We define Sales as revenues scaled by total assets. According to 
the previous studies, we expect 𝛽4 to be positive. 
 In addition to FCF, we include cash holdings at time t to account for the firm’s financial 
slack. Myers and Majluf (1984)’s model predicts that, under information asymmetry, firms with 
more financial slack are more likely to be able to undertake positive NPV projects. Love (2003) 
and Lins et al. (2005), among others, find results that are consistent with this prediction. We 
define Cash as cash holdings divided by total assets. Accordingly, we expect 𝛽5 to be positive.  
 To account for the variations in growth opportunities, we include Tobin’s q (q) in the 
regression equation. The higher Tobin’s q, the higher growth opportunities a firm has. Many 
studies, including previously discussed, find a positive association between Tobin’s q and future 
investments. Following Lins et al(2005), we use Market-to-Book value ratio as a proxy for 
Tobin’s q. Specifically, we define q as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt 
divided by total assets. Consistent with previous literature, we expect 𝛽6 to be positive. 
 To avoid outliers, we take the natural logarithm of the variable plus one for all variables. 
We choose the logarithmic transformation to avoid outliers over other approaches (e.g. 
winsorizing or trimming) to avoid discarding information as argued by Malmendier and Tate 
(2005). In addition, following Lins et al. (2005), we use U.S. Dollar converted values of the 
variables to avoid biases triggered by inflationary effects. 
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 We estimate Equation (1) with two alternative approaches, cross sectional and two-stage 
panel regressions. First, we perform cross-sectional regressions for each year and report the 
coefficients’ averages and statistics across years. In this approach, we include country dummies 
to control for country effects. In addition, we use Huber-White standard errors to account for the 
possible presence of heteroscedasticity. We use this approach for multiple reasons. First, it 
allows us to exploit larger number of firms, as the alternative approach requires firms to have 
more annual observations. The maximum number of firms in the cross-sectional approach is 
9909 firms while it is 6811 firms in the alternative approach. Second, since firms with very few 
annual observations are not included in the two-stage panel approach, using cross sectional 
regressions may better account for the possible survivorship bias that the two-stage panel 
approach may suffer from. Third, the estimates of the standard errors, under the cross-sectional 
approach, are likely to be more accurately stated with the potential of serially correlated errors. 
 The second approach is based on two-stage panel regressions. This approach is beneficial 
in two different ways. First, it allows us to control for the time variations in our sample that are 
ignored in the cross-sectional regressions. Second, it addresses the potential endogeneity 
problem, discussed in the recent literature (Erickson and Whited, 2000; Bond and Van Reenen, 
2008; Almeida et al., 2010; Munoz 2013), which arises from the inclusion of Tobin’s q in the 
corporate investment equation. Bond and Van Reened (2008) and Almeida et al. (2010) show 
that when Tobin’s q, as measured in our study, is included in the corporate investment equation, 
an endogeneity problem may be present due to measurement errors. They propose different 
approaches to solve this issue. Almeida et al. (2010) find that a simple framework of OLS with 
instrumental variables (i.e. two-stage least squares) outperforms more complicated solutions, 
examined in their study. Following Almeida et al. (2010) and Munoz (2013), we keep the 
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equation in level and instrument q with two lags of q’s first difference. We perform two 
instrumental variable tests, namely Kleibergan-Paap and Hansen J, to assure the validity of the 
instrumental variables used8. To account for the serial dependence at the firm level and 
heteroskedasticity, we use standard errors that are Huber-White corrected and clustered at the 
firm level. Furthermore, we include year dummies to account for business cycle effects (Lang et 
al., 1996). Lang et al. (1996) argue that if investment is high in a given year because of the 
business cycle and leverage happens to be low, we end up with a conclusion that is influenced by 
the business cycle effects. In fact, we show, in a later section, how investments and liquidity 
were both significantly affected by the 2008 credit crisis. If the surrounding years of the 2008 
credit crisis are not controlled for, any supportive evidence to our hypotheses may be attributed 
to an omitted variable bias. Finally, we use firm fixed effects to capture the heterogeneity across 
the firms in our sample.  
2.2. The Role of Financial Constraints 
To investigate our second hypothesis in which we expect a higher stock liquidity effect on 
corporate investment for more financially constrained firms, we first introduce several 
determinants of financial constraints. Particularly, we use firm size, firm leverage, firm payout 
ratio and Kaplan and Zingales (1997)’s index (KZ index, hereafter). We choose to use different 
financial constraint determinants to assure that our results are not sensitive to the choice of a 
single determinant. Since our data covers a large number of firms from a broad set of different 
                                                          
8 The under identification test (Kleibergan-Paap) tests the null hypothesis that the correlation 
between the endogenous variable (q) and the instruments is zero. The over identification test 
(Hansen J) tests the null hypothesis that the correlation between the instruments and the error 
terms is zero. The validity of our estimation procedure requires the former to be statistically 
significant and the latter to be statistically insignificant. These two requirements hold for all 
results. 
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countries, we are able to separate the firm level effect from the country effect. Even though the 
set of countries considered in our sample are emerging markets, it is still natural to expect that 
financially constrained firms could be concentrated in less financially developed countries. To 
capture the country effect, we sort firms based on the financial determinants within each country. 
That is, firms are sorted every year into four quartiles using different break points for each 
country.  
Firm Size has been used throughout the literature to proxy for the level of financial 
constraints (Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995; Erickson and Whited, 2000; Almedia et al., 2004; 
Acharya et al. 2007; Denis and Sibilkov, 2009). Almedia et al. (2004) argue that small firms tend 
to be younger and less well known, which result in making them more vulnerable to capital 
market imperfections. On an annual basis, we rank firms by total assets within each country into 
four quartiles. Then, we create a dummy variable that takes one if the firm is assigned in the top 
quartile and zero otherwise. This dummy represents firms with the least financial constraints, 
controlling for country effects.  
Firm Leverage ratio is also another proxy for financial constraints (e.g. Greenaway et al. 
2007). Intuitively, we expect firms with high leverage outstanding to have a lower debt capacity 
or ability to raise additional capital to finance new investments. We define leverage ratio as long-
term debt divided by total asset. Annually, we rank firms within each country by the leverage 
ratio into four quartiles. Similarly, we construct a dummy variable that takes one if the firm is 
assigned in the top quartile and zero otherwise. This dummy represents firms with the most 
financial constraints, controlling for country effects.  
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Payout Ratio is one of the most commonly used variables to proxy for financial constraints 
(Fazzari et al., 1988; Lamont et al., 2001; Almeida et al., 2004; Acharya et al. 2007; Denis and 
Sibilkov, 2009; and others). The intuition is that low dividend firms have less internal financing 
capacity, which make them more in need of external capital to finance new investments 
(Hennessy and Whited, 2007). Therefore, Fazzari et al. (1988) predict that financially 
unconstrained firms are more likely to have higher payout ratios. We define payout ratio as the 
sum of cash dividends and stock repurchases divided by income before extraordinary items. For 
each year, we rank firms within each country by all positive payout ratios into four quartiles. We 
define a dummy variable that takes one if the firm is in the top quartile or has a negative payout 
ratio9. This dummy represents firms with the least financial constraints, controlling for country 
effects. 
 KZ index is introduced by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and has been used to proxy for 
financial constraints in many related studies (Lamont et al. 2001; Almeida et al., 2004; Hennessy 
and Whited, 2007; and others). Kaplan and Zingales (1997) utilize the annual reports of the 
constrained firms in Farazzi et al. (1988) and construct a scale variable that ranks firms by their 
financial constraints. Then, they estimate an ordered logit regression of this scale variable on 
several firm characteristics. The KZ index is constructed from the following equation: 
𝐾𝑍 = −1.002 ∗ 𝐹𝐶𝐹 + 0.283 ∗ 𝑞 + 3.139 ∗ 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 − 39.368 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠/𝑇𝐴 − 1.315
∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 
                                                          
9 A negative payout ratio indicates that the firm pays dividends or repurchases stocks while 
reporting negative income before extraordinary items. 
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Where FCF is the sum of earnings before income and tax and depreciation minus dividends 
divided by total assets, q is market value of assets (price times shares outstanding plus book 
value of total debt) divided by total assets, Leverage is total debt divided by total assets, 
Dividends/TA is cash dividends divided by total assets, and Cash is cash holdings divided by 
total assets.  
Initially, we independently rank firms based on those financial constraint determinants. 
However, from the independent rankings, it turns out that the large size dummy is positively 
correlated with the high leverage dummy with a correlation of 0.3, which is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Nevertheless, we expect high leverage firms to be more financially 
constrained and large size firms to be less financially constrained. This positive and high 
correlation indicates that a considerable portion of large firms in our emerging market sample 
also happen to maintain high leverage, which may offset the benefits they get from being well 
known and older. To solve this issue, we pre-rank firms into two quantiles within each country 
based on total assets and leverage ratio. Then, we rank firms in each of these two quantiles in 
each country into four quartiles by total assets and leverage ratio. Doing so, we have two 
dummies based on double rankings that indicate large size firms, controlling for leverage effect 
and high leverage firms, controlling for large size effect10. For the other financial constraint 
determinants, there is no indication of such an issue.  
                                                          
10 This is analogous to the formation of HML in Fama and French (1993) where they first rank 
stocks by size then in each size quantile they rank firms by BM. This captures the BM effect, 
controlling for the size effect. Similarly, Amihud et al. (2015) construct IML by first ranking 
firms by volatility then in each volatility quintile they rank firms by stock illiquidity. Likewise, 
this captures the illiquidity effect, controlling for volatility effect. The large size effect from the 
independent ranking is statistically insignificant. However, the leverage effect from the 
independent ranking yields very similar results to the double ranking results. 
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To account for the expected variations in the stock liquidity effect on corporate investment, 
we adjust Equation (1) to include an interaction variable that allows the slope of Liquidity to vary 
across the level of financial constraints. Specifically, we estimate the following equation: 
𝐼𝑡+1
𝐾𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐹𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐶𝑡 +  𝛽4  
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡+1
𝑇𝐴𝑡
+ 𝛽5 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡
+ 𝛽6 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽7 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑞𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 (2) 
 Where FC is the financial constraint indicator that can be Large Size, High Leverage, 
High Payout or High KZ Index. We include FC because our financial constraint determinants are 
time-variant (i.e. assigned on annual basis). Similarly, we estimate Equation (2) using IV-OLS 
with firm fixed effect, year dummies and standard errors that are Huber-White corrected and 
clustered at the firm level. They key estimate for our second hypothesis is 𝛽3. For Large Size and 
High Payout, we expect 𝛽3 to be negative. This implies that the effect of stock liquidity on future 
investments is lower in the least financially constrained firms. For High Leverage and High KZ 
Index, we expect 𝛽3 to be negative. This, on the other hand, implies that the effect of stock 
liquidity on future investment is more pronounced in the most financial constrained firms. 
3. Data and Preliminary Analysis 
We use a sample of firms drawn from 21 emerging markets, namely Brazil, Chile China, 
Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey. The 
sample period is from 2000 to 2015. Our main source of daily security data and annual 
accounting data is obtained from Global Compustat.  
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We begin by processing the daily security data for each firm to construct our liquidity 
measures from annual averages of firm daily liquidity. Specifically, we compute daily Amihud 
measure, using U.S. dollar return and volume and daily Turnover measure. Annual currency 
exchange rates for each country relative to the US are obtained from the Federal Reserve 
Economic Data (FRED) and the World Bank. Initially, we have a total of 17248 firms with 
reported daily data. Following previous studies that deal with large international data (e.g. 
Karolyi et al. 2012), we apply the following filtering criteria to the daily prices data: we drop 
observations that are reported in a currency other than the country’s local currency and we only 
keep observation for common stocks. This reduces the total number of firms by 632 firms. We 
exclude observations with missing the close price variable. After calculating daily returns, we 
exclude observations with missing the trading volume variable. This reduces the total number of 
firm by 163 firms. Following Karolyi et al. (2012), we exclude days with 90% or more of the 
stocks have a return of zero in a given year, representing non-trading days. Furthermore, we 
exclude stocks with zero daily returns for more than 80% in a given year, representing non-
traded stocks. This excludes 29 firms and makes the final number of firms from the daily data 
drop to 16424 firms. Because we only need annual observations for each firm in order to merge 
it with the annual accounting data, we calculate annual liquidity measure from averages of the 
daily liquidity for each firm. Then, we keep only one observation for each firm-year.  
 Similarly, we construct the key accounting variables for each firm from Global 
Compustat (Fundamentals Annual). We use U.S. converted data to construct our key variables, 
as mentioned before. Initially, there are 15587 firms from the 21 emerging markets in our sample 
that have reported observations in the annual data. We exclude financials firms (SIC 60-67) due 
to the differences in its nature compared to other industries. This yields a total number of 13244 
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firms. Then, we merge the file that contains the annual liquidity measure, previously constructed 
from the daily data, with the annual accounting data file. The number of firms that have annual 
observations in both files is 12574. Finally, we require annual observations to have available data 
in the following key variables: Amihud, Turnover, Earnings before income and tax (EBIT), 
Depreciation (DP), Dividends (DV), Total Assets (TA), Total Debt (LT), Revenues (REVT) and 
Cash (CH). Because our regression specifications require at least two observations for each firm, 
we exclude stocks with only one annual observation. Our final sample consists of 9898 firms 
with 71314 annual observations.  
 In Table 1 Panel A, we report the summary statistics of the key variables in the study. 
Namely, we report means, medians, standard deviations and bottom and top 1 percentile of the 
investment measures, liquidity measures, and other firm characteristics. The average and median 
CAPX scaled by K is 0.24 and 0.15 respectively, while the average and median CAPX scaled by 
total assets is 0.07 and 0.04, respectively. These are comparable to the sample of Love (2003) 
whose means and medians of CAPX/K, based on 36 countries, were 0.26 and 0.19, respectively. 
Our sample means of cash flow to total assets, leverage ratio, sales to total assets, cash to total 
asset and q are 0.08, 0.37, 0.59, 0.12 and 0.97, respectively. These statistics are also comparable 
to studies that use U.S. samples (e.g. Malmendier and Tate, 2005).  
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Table 1: Descriptive and Preliminary Analysis 
Panel A presents the means, medians, standard deviations and the 1st and 99th percentiles for each variable included 
in the study. CAPXt+j/Kt is defined as the capital expenditures in period t+j, where j is equal one or two, divided by 
K in period t, which is defined as net property plant and equipment minus capital expenditure plus depreciation. 
CAPXt+j/TAt is defined as the capital expenditures in t+j, where j is equal one or two, divided by total assets (TA) in 
t. Amihud is the annual average of the daily Amihud measure. Daily Amihud measure is defined as the absolute 
daily returns divided by the U.S. dollar volume. We take the log of Amihud measure plus one to avoid outliers and 
multiply it by minus one to convert it to a liquidity measure. Turnover is the annual average of the daily Turnover 
measure. Turnover measure is defined as the daily volume divided by shares outstanding. Likewise, we take the log 
of Turnover measure plus one to avoid outliers. FCF is defined as the sum of earnings before interest and tax and 
deprecation minus dividends scaled by the beginning period total assets. Leverage is defined as total debt divided 
by total assets. Sales is defined as revenues scaled by total assets. Tobin’s q is computed as the sum of market value 
of equity and book value of debt divided by total assets. Panel B shows the pairwise Pearson's correlation between 
variables included in the study. Definitions of all variables are provided in Panel A. For each correlation coefficient, 
the table reports the level of the statistical significance. The superscripts a, b, and c refer to 1%, 5% and 10% 
statistical significance level, respectively. Panel C reports the means and medians of investment and liquidity 
measures for one-year or two-year window before and during the credit financial crisis. The definitions of the 
investment and liquidity measures are provided in Panel A. For each variable, the mean is reported in the first row 
and the median is reported in brackets in the second row. The differences between the means and the medians are 
also reported in the last column for each window. For each mean difference, a t-test is conducted of a zero mean 
difference. Similarly, Wilcoxon rank sum test is used to test the median equality for each median difference. The 
superscripts *, **, ***, and ^ refer to 1%, 5%, 10%, and one-tail statistical significance level. 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
    Percentiles 
Variable Mean Median Standard Deviation 1st 99th 
      
Investment      
CAPXt+1/Kt 0.236 0.147 0.331 0.001 1.487 
CAPXt+2/Kt 0.254 0.152 0.365 0.000 1.663 
CAPXt+1/TAt 0.065 0.042 0.074 0.000 0.352 
CAPXt+2/TAt 0.074 0.044 0.102 0.000 0.448 
      
Liquidity      
Amihud -0.154 0.000 5.715 0.000 -2.328 
Turnover 0.007 0.003 0.013 0.000 0.044 
      
Controls      
FCF 0.075 0.069 0.099 -0.179 0.332 
Leverage 0.371 0.379 0.161 0.050 0.698 
Sales 0.588 0.555 0.293 0.063 1.471 
Cash 0.115 0.082 0.111 0.001 0.493 
Tobin’s q 0.968 0.787 0.768 0.283 5.103 
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In Table 1 Panel B, we show the pairwise correlation between the key variables. The 
correlation between the two investment measures is 0.56 and statistically significant at 1% level. 
Furthermore, the correlation between the two liquidity measures is 0.014 and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. In the relation between future investments and current liquidity, all 
Table 1 - Continued 
Panel B: Pairwise correlation matrix 
 
CAPXt+1
/Kt 
CAPXt+1/
TAt 
Amihud Turnover 
Cash 
Flow 
Leverage Sales Cash 
Tobin’s 
q 
CAPXt+1/Kt 1         
CAPXt+1/TAt 0.556a 1        
Amihud 0.007c 0.010a 1       
Turnover 0.040a 0.081a 0.014a 1      
Cash Flow 0.325a 0.171a 0.026a -0.078a 1     
Leverage -0.020a -0.077a -0.013a -0.014a -0.047a 1    
Sales -0.018a 0.035a -0.004 -0.080a 0.189a 0.137a 1   
Cash 0.007c 0.223a 0.017a 0.200a -0.053a -0.342a -0.025a 1  
Tobin’s q 0.085a 0.098a 0.013a 0.070a 0.115a 0.005 -0.010a 0.123a 1 
Panel C: Impact of the credit crisis of 2008 on Variable Means and Medians 
 One-Year Window  Two-Year Window  
Variable 2007 2008 Difference 2006-2007 2008-2009 Difference 
       
Investment       
CAPXt+1/Kt 
0.270 0.235 0.034*** 0.267 0.242 0.025*** 
[0.167] [0.128] [0.039]*** [0.165] [0.135] [0.03]*** 
       
CAPXt+1/TAt 
0.075 0.066 0.070*** 0.079 0.068 0.011*** 
[0.046] [0.035] [0.011]*** [0.048] [0.038] [0.01]*** 
       
Liquidity       
Amihud 
-0.044 -0.183 0.140^ -0.031 -1.129 0.098* 
[0.000] [-0.001] [0.001]*** [0.000] [-0.001] [0.001]*** 
       
Turnover 
0.010 0.006 0.004*** 0.0087 0.0085 0.0002 
[0.004] [0.002] [0.002]*** [0.004] [0.002] [0.002]*** 
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measures yield positive correlations, which are also statistically significant at the 1% (except 
CAPX/K with Amihud where the correlation is positive but only significant at the 10% level).  In  
addition, Leverage seems to negatively correlate with all variables except Tobin’s q, which has a 
correlation that is statistically indifferent from zero.  
 In Table 1 Panel C, we show the impact of the credit crisis of 2008 on the means and 
medians of the key variables in the study. We consider one-year and two-year windows to 
examine different timings of the effect. Interestingly, there is a statistically significant drop in 
both future investment (one year lead) and liquidity between one year prior the crisis (2007) and 
one year during the crisis (2008) or two years prior the crisis (2006-2007), and two years during 
the crisis (2008-2009). We report the p-value from t-tests to examine the difference between the 
two periods’ means and we report the p-value from Wilcoxon Rank-sum Tests to examine the 
difference between the two periods’ medians. Moreover, Figure 1 plots the time path of the 
medians of those key variables. Consistent with the mean and median analysis, we clearly see a 
drop in the time path of these variables surrounding the credit crisis of 2008. In fact, the time 
path of the liquidity measures and future investments seem to correspond with each other, which 
may indicate the causality effect that we intend to test in a regression framework. However, as 
the credit crisis effect on investments and liquidity may indicate, those key variables may be 
correlated because of a time effect rather than a causality effect. Therefore, as mentioned before, 
we control for the time effect or business cycle effect by including year dummies to control for a 
possible omitted variable bias. 
 In Table 2, we show some key statistics for each country in our sample. For each country, 
we report the data start year, the data end year, number of firms and observations and means of
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Table 2: Summary Statistics by Country 
This table reports key statistics for all countries in the sample. For each country, it reports the start year, end year, number of firms, proportion of total 
firms, number of annual observation, proportion of total annual observations, and means of investments measures and liquidity measures. The full 
definitions of the investment and liquidity measures are provided in Table 1 Panel A. 
    Investment Measures Liquidity Measures 
Countries Start 
Year 
End 
Year 
No. 
Firms 
% Firms No. Obs. % Obs. CAPXt+j/Kt CAPXt+j/TAt Amihud Turnover 
j=1 j=2 j=1 j=2 
Brazil 2000 2015 242 2.4 1560 2.2 0.243 0.261 0.065 0.073 -0.058 0.003 
Chile 2000 2015 152 1.5 1361 1.9 0.145 0.165 0.058 0.068 -1.042 0.001 
China 2000 2015 2464 24.9 21223 29.8 0.274 0.301 0.071 0.083 0.000 0.014 
Colombia 2002 2015 31 0.3 186 0.3 0.167 0.203 0.051 0.060 -0.010 0.001 
Czech 
Republic 2000 2015 24 0.2 122 0.2 0.131 0.141 0.071 0.075 -0.167 0.001 
Egypt 2000 2015 106 1.1 445 0.6 0.170 0.197 0.059 0.066 -0.003 0.003 
Greece 2000 2015 225 2.3 1330 1.9 0.167 0.160 0.048 0.048 -0.268 0.002 
Hungary 2000 2015 23 0.2 136 0.2 0.191 0.210 0.088 0.095 -0.052 0.002 
India 2000 2015 1790 18.1 10520 14.8 0.303 0.328 0.087 0.098 -0.452 0.003 
Indonesia 2000 2015 334 3.4 2206 3.1 0.223 0.244 0.068 0.078 -0.436 0.002 
Malaysia 2000 2015 959 9.7 7144 10.0 0.164 0.175 0.048 0.053 -0.036 0.002 
Mexico 2000 2015 87 0.9 652 0.9 0.152 0.165 0.056 0.062 -0.036 0.001 
Morocco 2003 2015 50 0.5 254 0.4 0.265 0.295 0.074 0.081 -0.030 0.005 
Peru 2000 2015 71 0.7 524 0.7 0.152 0.165 0.061 0.069 -0.010 0.002 
Philippines 2000 2015 155 1.6 1084 1.5 0.208 0.240 0.057 0.066 -0.282 0.001 
Poland 2000 2015 319 3.2 1331 1.9 0.254 0.261 0.063 0.070 -0.078 0.002 
Russia 2002 2015 135 1.4 542 0.8 0.213 0.291 0.110 0.161 -2.346 0.000 
S. Africa 2000 2015 269 2.7 1813 2.5 0.308 0.333 0.070 0.080 -0.330 0.002 
Taiwan 2000 2015 1780 18.0 14254 20.0 0.194 0.202 0.049 0.053 -0.036 0.008 
Thailand 2000 2015 511 5.2 3875 5.4 0.206 0.228 0.067 0.075 -0.078 0.006 
Turkey 2005 2015 171 1.7 752 1.1 0.224 0.244 0.060 0.065 -0.003 0.007 
             
All 2000 2015 9898 100% 71314 100% 0.236 0.254 0.065 0.074 -0.154 0.007 
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the investment measures and liquidity measures. Except for Colombia, Morocco, Russia and 
Turkey, the data of all countries in our sample start in 2000 and end in 2015. The reason those 
four countries’ starting years range from 2002 to 2005 is because we do not have sufficient data 
for prior years. Table 2 shows that the largest number of firms comes from China (24.9% of all 
firms) followed by India and Taiwan with 1790 firms (18.1% of all firms) and 1780 firms (18% 
of all firms), respectively. Whereas, Colombia, Czech Republic and Hungary have only 78 firms 
combined (about 1% of all firms). The total number of annual observations in our sample is 
71314 observations corresponding to 9898 firms. In addition, Table 2 reports the averages of 
investments and liquidity across countries. China, India, Indonesia, Morocco and Russia are 
among the highest ten countries in terms of investment ratios across all measures. On the other 
hand, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Greece, Malaysia, Mexico and Taiwan are mong the lowest test 
countries in terms of investment ratios across all measures. We refrain from comparing liquidity 
levels across countries because of the differences in trading volume definitions across stock 
exchanges (Karolyi et al., 2012). 
4. Main Findings 
In this section, we provide a detailed discussion of the results from the regression analyses. 
We begin with the results from the cross sectional regressions and then the two-stage panel 
regressions. Later, we show the findings for the role of financial constraints on the investment 
and liquidity relation. 
4.1.  Cross Sectional Regressions 
As previously outlined, we estimate Equation (1) from cross sectional regressions on an 
annual basis where we include country dummies to capture the heterogeneity across countries. 
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Table 3 shows the results from the averages of time-series coefficients and R-squares from those 
cross sectional regressions where the dependent variable is CAPX/K. We report four different 
models. Namely, we report the results of two models where we include Amihud as the liquidity 
measure and consider 1-year or 2-year investment lead. Alternatively, we use Turnover as the 
liquidity measure in the other two models. To individually test the null hypothesis that the 
independent variable coefficients are equal zero, we report the p-value from t-tests of zero 
means. In addition, we report, for each independent variable, the number of coefficients with an 
expected sign and the number of statistically significant coefficients across years (equations). We 
use Huber-White corrected standard errors when computing the p-values, to account for the 
possible presence of heteroskedasticity. Also, we report the minimum, maximum and unique 
number of firms included in all models. Similarly, Table 4 reports same results, however we use 
CAPX/TA as the dependent variable. As shown, the lowest minimum number of firms, included 
in the cross sectional equations, is 1516 firms while the highest maximum number is 6464. 
Moreover, the minimum number of unique firms appear in all equations is 9131 while the 
maximum number of unique firms is 9909. 
In Table 3, FCF appears to positively affect future investments with 1-year and 2-year leads, 
which show as well statistically significant coefficients at the 1% level. This is expected since 
firms’ investments, in emerging markets, are more likely to be sensitive to their free cash flows 
as they have less access to external capital. Apparently, this is consistent with the previous 
findings on the investment-cash sensitivity (e.g. Love (2003) and Lins et al., 2005, among 
others). When we look at each year separately, FCF effect is positive and statistically significant 
always. Likewise, the coefficients of Sales are positive, as expected, and statistically significant 
at the 1% level across all models, and this is also true when we look at each year separately. This  
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Table 3: Cross Sectional Regressions of Future Investments Scaled by Capital on Liquidity 
This table reports the average estimates along with the means and medians of R2 across years from annual cross 
sectional regressions of Equation (1). For each model, the table reports the minimum, maximum, and unique 
number of firms included in the estimation. In the second column, the table states the expected sign for each 
independent variable. In addition, it reports the number of expected signed and statistically significant (in 
parenthesis) coefficients across equations for each independent variable. The dependent variable is log transformed 
in the following form: ln [𝑦/(1 − 𝑦)], where y is the dependent variable. The log values of Amihud and Turnover 
are included in the regressions. The estimated equation is: 
𝐼𝑡+𝑗
𝐾𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 + 𝛽2  
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡+𝑗
𝑇𝐴𝑡
+
𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽5 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑞𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡, where the dependent variable (I) is the firm’s capital 
expenditure at time t+1 or t+2 scaled by the beginning period capital (K). Full definitions of the variables appearing 
in the equation above are provided in Table 1 Panel A. Also, country dummies are included in each of the cross 
sectional regression. The p-values of the zero mean t-test are reported in parenthesis. The subscripts *, **, *** refer 
to 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable CAPXt+j/Kt 
 E[sign] Amihud Turnover 
  j=1 j=2 j=1 j=2 
Liquidityt + 0.075*** 0.073*** 0.085*** 0.077*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# >0 (# sig)  15(15) 14(14) 15(15) 14(13) 
FCFt+j + 3.757*** 4.171*** 4.006*** 4.319*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# >0 (# sig)  15(15) 14(14) 15(15) 14(14) 
Leveraget - -0.602*** -0.674*** -0.661*** -0.732*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# <0 (# sig)  15(12) 14(10) 15(9) 14(10) 
Salest + 0.797*** 0.872*** 0.756*** 0.837*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# >0 (# sig)  15(15) 14(14) 15(15) 14(14) 
Casht + 3.188*** 3.146*** 3.220*** 3.171*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# >0 (# sig)  15(15) 14(14) 15(15) 14(14) 
qt + -0.018 -0.011 0.045*** 0.053*** 
  (0.192) (0.484) (0.000) (0.000) 
# >0 (# sig)  5(4) 7(3) 14(5) 13(6) 
      
Country Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 Mean 0.223 0.238 0.214 0.229 
 Median 0.231 0.241 0.217 0.230 
# Years (Eqs)  15 14 15 14 
      
# Firms Min 1527 1516 1534 1522 
 Max 6055 5651 6059 5652 
 Unique 9721 9131 9731 9138 
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is consistent with the hypothesis that expects sales to play an accelerator effect for corporate   
investments (Hoshi et al., 1991; and Lins et al., 2005). Again, the coefficient of Sales has the 
expected sign and statistically significant in all years. Similarly, the coefficient of Cash has the 
expected positive sign in all models and statistically significant at 1% level, which is also the 
case when the results from the separate regressions are considered. This supports the argument 
that firms with more financial slack are more likely to be able to undertake positive NPV projects 
(e.g. Love, 2003; Lins et al., 2005; among others). On the other hand, we find Leverage to be 
negatively associated with future investments with statistically significant coefficients at the 1% 
level in all models. The expected sign in Leverage is evident in all years, yet in a few years, the 
coefficient is not statistically significant at the 10% level. The findings of the negative 
association between Leverage and future investment provide confirmatory evidence to the 
prediction that firms with high level of leverage have lower ability (due to less debt capacity) to 
raise additional capital when needed (Lang et al., 1996; and Hovakimian, 2009). For q, its 
expected effect on future investment is positive, as argued and evident in many previous studies. 
The results hold as expected when Turnover is used however in models where Amihud is 
included, the coefficient of q is negative though statistically highly insignificant.  
More interestingly, the coefficient of liquidity is positive and statistically significant at 1% 
level, indicating that future investment increases in stock liquidity. In fact, when we look at each 
equation separately, we find this positive relation to be present and statistically significant in all 
equations11. This is consistent whether we use Amihud or Turnover as a proxy for stock liquidity, 
or whether we use 1-year or 2-year investment leads. This finding is supportive evidence to our 
                                                          
11 The only exception is when 2-year lead of investment measure and Turnover are used in which 
liquidity loses its statistical significance in only one year. 
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first hypothesis, which states that stock liquidity reduces the cost of equity, therefore increases 
future investments. 
As early mentioned, international firms are more likely to accurately report total assets as 
opposed to capital employed (Lins et al., 2005). Therefore, we find it necessary to reassure our 
Table 4: Cross Sectional Regressions of Future Investments Scaled by Total Assets on Liquidity 
This table is similar to Table 3. However, the dependent variable (I) is the firm’s capital expenditure at time t+1 or 
t+2 scaled by total assets at time t. 
Dependent Variable CAPXt+j/TAt 
 E[sign] Amihud Turnover 
  j=1 j=2 j=1 j=2 
Liquidityt + 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.032*** 0.027*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
# >0 (# sig)  15(15) 14(14) 15(8) 12(6) 
FCFt+j + 4.897*** 4.890*** 5.102*** 5.005*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# >0 (# sig)  15(15) 14(14) 15(15) 14(14) 
Leveraget - -0.693*** -0.772*** -0.707*** -0.785*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
# <0 (# sig)  15(14) 14(14) 15(13) 14(14) 
Salest + 0.255** 0.331*** 0.211* 0.294*** 
  (0.022) (0.003) (0.051) (0.008) 
# >0 (# sig)  12(8) 12(9) 8(8) 11(9) 
Casht + 0.052 0.021 0.119 0.092 
  (0.807) (0.912) (0.594) (0.638) 
# >0 (# sig)  5(6) 4(7) 5(6) 5(5) 
qt + -0.032** -0.019 0.021* 0.038*** 
  (0.027) (0.217) (0.070) (0.002) 
# >0 (# sig)  4(6) 5(2) 11(3) 13(5) 
      
Country Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 Mean 0.209 0.231 0.197 0.220 
 Median 0.221 0.254 0.203 0.235 
# Years (Eqs)  15 14 15 14 
      
# Firms Min 1587 1628 1594 1635 
 Max 6460 5885 6464 5886 
 Unique 9898 9341 9909 9349 
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findings by considering investments relative to total assets rather than relative to capital 
employed. Nevertheless, the results in Table 4 produce very similar conclusions.   
4.2.  Two Stage Panel Regressions 
This approach helps account for time variations and address the potential endogeneity issue, 
caused by measurement errors in q (Bond and Van Reenen, 2008; Almeida et al., 2010). Table 5 
reports the estimation results of Equation (1) from two-stage regressions. As discussed before, 
we simply use firm fixed effects to capture heterogeneity across firms, include year dummies to 
account for possible time and business cycle effects, and instrument q with two lags of q’s first 
difference. We perform two instrumental tests to test the validity of the approach, namely 
Kleibergan-Paap and Hansen J. Kleibergan-Paap tests the null hypothesis that the correlation 
between the endogenous variable (q) and the instruments is zero (i.e. under identification). 
Hansen J, on the other hand, tests whether the correlation between the instruments and the error 
terms is zero (i.e. over identification). The validity of our estimation procedure requires the 
former to be statistically significant and the latter to be statistically insignificant. Apparently, 
these two requirements hold for all the results.  
Because this approach requires firms to have more annual observation in order to be 
included, the highest number of firms included in all model is 6940 whereas the lowest number 
of firms is 5936, which both are far less than those used in the cross sectional approach. In Table 
5, the coefficients of all control variables have their expected signs and statistically significant at 
1% level. Surprisingly, q also appears to have positive and statistically significant coefficient in 
all models as opposed to the mixed results found in the cross sectional regressions. More 
importantly, both liquidity measures in all models have positive and statistically significant  
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Table 5: Two-Stage Panel Regressions of Future Investments Scaled by Capital on Liquidity  
This table reports the results from the two-stage panel regressions. The equation estimated and variables included 
are the same as those in Table 3. However, two-stage panel regression with firm fixed effects and year dummies 
is adopted. The variable q is instrumented with two lags of q’s first difference.  Standard errors used are Huber-
white corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. P-values of zero coefficient hypothesis are 
reported in parentheses for each independent variable. The last two rows report two instrumental variables tests. 
The under identification test (Kleibergan-Paap) tests the null hypothesis that the correlation between the 
endogenous variable (q) and the instruments is zero. The over identification test (Hansen J) tests the null 
hypothesis that the correlation between the instruments and the error terms is zero. The subscripts *, **, *** refer 
to 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable CAPXt+j/Kt 
 E[sign] Amihud Turnover 
  j=1 j=2 j=1 j=2 
Liquidityt + 0.070*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.047*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
FCFt+j + 2.558*** 2.784*** 2.526*** 2.756*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Leveraget - -1.405*** -2.014*** -1.508*** -2.058*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Salest + 0.406*** 0.561*** 0.426*** 0.567*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Casht + 2.345*** 2.370*** 2.372*** 2.392*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
qt + 0.272*** 0.327*** 0.332*** 0.346*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Firm FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
R2  0.087 0.115 0.080 0.114 
      
# Firms  6811 5935 6811 5936 
# Observations  43866 36709 43869 36713 
      
IV tests      
Kleibergan-Paap  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen J  (0.5506) (0.2881) (0.7554) (0.1519) 
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estimates, confirming our previous results. 
For robustness check, we re-run the two-stage regressions of Equation (1) using total assets 
as a scaling factor. In Table 6, we report the results from the regressions where the dependent 
Table 6: Two-Stage Panel Regressions of Future Investments Scaled by Total Assets on Liquidity 
This table is similar to Table 5. However, the dependent variable (I) is the firm’s capital expenditure at time t+1 
or t+2 scaled by total assets at time t. 
Dependent Variable CAPXt+j/Kt 
 E[sign] Amihud Turnover 
  j=1 j=2 j=1 j=2 
Liquidityt + 0.044*** 0.013* 0.020** 0.029*** 
  (0.000) (0.051) (0.014) (0.002) 
      
FCFt+j + 2.728*** 3.217*** 2.703*** 3.205*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Leveraget - -1.055*** -1.338*** -1.117*** -1.355*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Salest + 0.535*** 0.736*** 0.549*** 0.734*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Casht + 1.203*** 1.153*** 1.219*** 1.162*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
qt + 0.233*** 0.292*** 0.272*** 0.291*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Firm FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
R2  0.1064 0.1574 0.1036 0.1575 
      
# Firms  6948 6066 6948 6067 
# Observations  45334 38230 45337 38234 
      
IV tests      
Kleibergan-Paap  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen J  (0.478) (0.919) (0.636) (0.879) 
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variable is capital expenditure scaled by total assets reports the results, which are very similar to 
those reported in Table 5 and deliver consistent conclusions.  
4.3. The Interaction with The Levels of Financial Constraints 
The remaining of our findings is concerned with our second hypothesis. Essentially, we 
expect more financially constrained firms to exhibit more pronounced effect of stock liquidity on 
their investment due to their limited access to other external financing.  Following previous 
studies, we employ four different determinants of financial constraints, namely size, leverage 
ratio, payout ratio and KZ index, to shed light on the issue. In Table 7, we show the medians of 
the key variables in the study across financial constraint leverage. In Panel A, we rank firms by 
total assets, in the same manner discussed in the methodology section. For each determinant, we 
report the medians of the determinant its self, investment measures and liquidity measures for 
each quartile. For Size and Payout ratios, we report the p-value from the Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
of median equality between the least constrained or most constrained firms and all firms in the 
other quartiles. For Leverage ratio and KZ index, the median equality test is between the most 
constrained or most constrained firms and all firms in the other quartiles.  
Based on Size ranking, the median total assets of the least constrained group is 770 U.S. 
million dollars and steadily decreases to 23.5 U.S. million dollars in the most constrained group. 
Similarly, based on Payout ratio ranking, the median payout ratio of the least constrained group 
is 68.6% while it gradually reaches zero payout ratio in the most constrained group. Likewise, 
based on Leverage ratio, the median leverage ratio of the least constrained group is about zero 
(all-equity firms) while it is 3%, 9.4% and 22.3% for the higher quartiles. Interestingly, Table 7 
shows that when firms ranked by Size or Payout ratio, investment levels and liquidity measures  
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are consistently decreasing with the level of financial constraints. However, based on Leverage 
ratio and KZ index, the patterns of investment levels and liquidity measures are mixed.  
Table 7: Medians of Key Variables Across Financial Constraint Levels  
This table reports the medians of the financial constraint variable, investment measure and liquidity measures across 
four financial constraint levels. Panel A, B, C and D rank firms within each country based on Total assets, Leverage 
ratio, Payout ratio and KZ index, respectively. Least Constrained represents firms in the bottom quartile and Most 
Constrained represents firms in the top quartile. In addition, the table report the p-values from Wilcoxon rank-sum 
test of median equality. For Size and Payout ratios, the table reports the p-value from the Wilcoxon rank-sum test of 
median equality between the least constrained or most constrained firms and all firms in the other quartiles. For 
Leverage ratio and KZ index, the median equality test is between the most constrained or most constrained firms and 
all firms in the other quartiles. Full definitions of the variables included in the table are provided in Table 1 Panel A. 
Quartiles: Least 
Constrained 
2 3 Most 
constrained 
Wilcoxon  
rank-sum test 
      
A. Ranked by Size      
Total Assets (Million USD) 770.090 186.475 73.821 23.418 (0.000) 
CAPXt+1/Kt 0.161 0.145 0.134 0.120 (0.000) 
CAPXt+1/TAt 0.044 0.039 0.036 0.031 (0.000) 
Ln(Amihud) 17.645 15.268 13.613 11.955 (0.000) 
Ln(Turnover) -6.089 -6.114 -6.194 -6.241 (0.024) 
B. Ranked by Leverage ratio      
Long-term Debt/TA 0.000 0.030 0.094 0.223 (0.000) 
CAPXt+1/Kt 0.151 0.153 0.142 0.122 (0.000) 
CAPXt+1/TAt 0.030 0.038 0.042 0.045 (0.000) 
Ln(Amihud) 15.514 14.326 14.796 15.114 (0.053) 
Ln(Turnover) -5.966 -6.401 -6.210 -6.082 (0.001) 
C. Ranked by Payout ratio      
Payout ratio 0.686 0.421 0.248 0.000 (0.000) 
CAPXt+1/Kt 0.112 0.178 0.221 0.126 (0.000) 
CAPXt+1/TAt 0.034 0.048 0.056 0.033 (0.000) 
Ln(Amihud) 16.286 16.576 16.907 14.985 (0.614) 
Ln(Turnover) -5.966 -5.962 -5.801 -5.835 (0.000) 
D. Ranked by KZ index      
Kaplan-Zingales Index -0.456 0.200 0.556 0.896 (0.000) 
CAPXt+1/Kt 0.195 0.173 0.146 0.104 (0.000) 
CAPXt+1/TAt 0.050 0.048 0.042 0.028 (0.000) 
Ln(Amihud) 16.714 16.339 16.208 15.899 (0.000) 
Ln(Turnover) -6.031 -5.895 -5.815 -5.777 (0.000) 
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Table 8: Financial Constraints and The Investment-Liquidity Sensitivity - Firm Size  
This table reports the results from estimating Equation (2) with two-stage panel regressions with firm fixed 
effects and year dummies. The variable q is instrumented with two lags of q’s first difference. In the second 
column, the table states the expected sign for each independent variable. The dependent variable is log 
transformed in the following form: ln [𝑦/(1 − 𝑦)], where y is the dependent variable. The log values of Amihud 
and Turnover are included in the regressions. The estimated equation is: 
𝐼𝑡+1
𝐾𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 +
 𝛽2 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽4  
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡+1
𝑇𝐴𝑡
+ 𝛽5 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽7 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑞𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡, 
where the dependent variable (I) is the firm’s capital expenditure at time t+1 scaled by the beginning period 
capital (K) in the first two models and scaled by the beginning period total asset (TA) in the last two models. 
Large is a financial constraint dummy that takes one if the firm is assigned in the top size quartile within its 
country and zero otherwise. The size rank is based on total assets and conducted on an annual basis. Liquidity * 
Large is an interaction variable between Liquidity and the dummy variable Large. Full definitions of the variables 
appearing in the equation above are provided in Table 1 Panel A. Standard errors used are Huber-white corrected 
for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. P-values of zero coefficient hypothesis are reported in 
parentheses for each independent variable. The last two rows report two instrumental variables tests. The under 
identification test (Kleibergan-Paap) tests the null hypothesis that the correlation between the endogenous 
variable (q) and the instruments is zero. The over identification test (Hansen J) tests the null hypothesis that the 
correlation between the instruments and the error terms is zero. The subscripts ***, **, * refer to 1%, 5%, and 
10% statistical significance levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable CAPXt+1/Kt CAPXt+1/TAt 
 E[sign] Amihud Turnover Amihud Turnover 
Liquidityt + 0.073*** 0.043*** 0.048*** 0.030*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 0.001 
Liquidityt * Larget - -0.013* -0.021* -0.013** -0.031*** 
  )0.062( )0.076( )0.022( )0.003( 
FCFt+1 + 2.561*** 2.534*** 2.724*** 2.703*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leveraget - -1.402*** -1.503*** -1.053*** -1.116*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Salest + 0.404*** 0.425*** 0.533*** 0.547*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Casht + 2.342*** 2.365*** 1.206*** 1.220*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
qt + 0.273*** 0.335*** 0.231*** 0.272*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2  0.0867 0.0806 0.1066 0.1038 
# Firms  6811 6811 6948 6948 
# Observations  43866 43869 45334 45337 
IV tests      
Kleibergan-Paap  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen J  )0.544( )0.746( )0.470( )0.628( 
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 Table 8 shows the results from the inclusion of the variable that represents the interaction 
between liquidity and a dummy for large firms. The large firm dummy takes one if the firm is in 
the top size quartile within its country, based on total assets, and zero otherwise. We include year 
dummies and the large size dummy in the regressions to control for the time variant effects on 
future investments.  Consistent with the second hypothesis, the coefficient of the interaction term 
is negative and statistically significant across all models. That is, future investments of large size 
firms are less affected by stock liquidity. This provides evidence to the hypothesis that less 
financially constrained firms have more access to capital, therefore their future investments are 
more likely to depend less on how liquid their stocks are. 
 In Table 9, we estimate a similar regression, however we instead include an interaction 
variable between liquidity and an indicator for high leverage firms. The indicator of high 
leverage firms takes one if the firm is assigned in the top leverage ratio quartile within its 
country and zero otherwise. Again, year dummies and the financial constraint indicator are 
included to capture the time variations in investment measures. The estimates of the interaction 
variable are positive and statistically significant in all models. In fact, we see, in most cases, the 
coefficient of the interaction variable is as large as the coefficient of the liquidity variable, 
indicating a double effect of liquidity on future investments for firms in the top high leverage 
quartile. This is consistent with our second hypothesis where we expect that high leverage firms, 
being more financially constrained, are more sensitive to their stock liquidity when it comes to 
making investment decisions. 
 Similarly, we present in Table 10 the results from using payout ratio as an indicator for 
financial constraints. High_Payout is a dummy that indicates firms that are ranked in the top 
payout ratio quartile within each country. The coefficient of the interaction variable between  
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Table 9: Financial Constraints and The Investment-Liquidity Sensitivity - Leverage Ratio 
This table reports the results from estimating Equation (2) with two-stage panel regressions with firm fixed 
effects and year dummies. The variable q is instrumented with two lags of q’s first difference. In the second 
column, the table states the expected sign for each independent variable. The dependent variable is log 
transformed in the following form: ln [𝑦/(1 − 𝑦)], where y is the dependent variable. The log values of Amihud 
and Turnover are included in the regressions. The estimated equation is: 
𝐼𝑡+1
𝐾𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 +
 𝛽2 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡 +  𝛽3 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑡 + 𝛽4  
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡+1
𝑇𝐴𝑡
+ 𝛽5 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽7 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝑞𝑡 +
𝜀𝑡, where the dependent variable (I) is the firm’s capital expenditure at time t+1 scaled by the beginning period 
capital (K) in the first two models and scaled by the beginning period total asset (TA) in the last two models. 
High_Lev is a financial constraint dummy that takes one if the firm is assigned in the top leverage quartile within 
its country and zero otherwise. The leverage rank is based on long-term debt scaled by total asset and conducted 
on an annual basis. Liquidity * High_Lev is an interaction variable between Liquidity and the dummy variable 
High_Lev. Full definitions of the variables appearing in the equation above are provided in Table 1 Panel A. 
Standard errors used are Huber-white corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. P-values of 
zero coefficient hypothesis are reported in parentheses for each independent variable. The last two rows report 
two instrumental variables tests. The under identification test (Kleibergan-Paap) tests the null hypothesis that the 
correlation between the endogenous variable (q) and the instruments is zero. The over identification test (Hansen 
J) tests the null hypothesis that the correlation between the instruments and the error terms is zero. The subscripts 
***, **, * refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable CAPXt+1/Kt CAPXt+1/TAt 
 E[sign] Amihud Turnover Amihud Turnover 
Liquidityt + 0.065*** 0.029*** 0.038*** 0.013^ 
  (0.000) )0.003( (0.000) )0.114( 
Liquidityt * 
High_Levt 
- 
0.019*** 0.030*** 0.022*** 0.030*** 
  )0.003( )0.010( (0.000) )0.004( 
FCFt+1 + 2.556*** 2.525*** 2.725*** 2.701*** 
  (0.000) )0.001( (0.000) (0.000) 
Leveraget - -1.439*** -1.544*** -1.096*** -1.161*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Salest + 0.420*** 0.441*** 0.552*** 0.566*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Casht + 2.359*** 2.384*** 1.219*** 1.233*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
qt + 0.275*** 0.334*** 0.237*** 0.274*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2  0.087 0.0808 0.1075 0.1043 
# Firms  6810 6810 6948 6948 
# Observations  43863 43866 45331 45334 
IV tests      
Kleibergan-Paap  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen J  )0.502( )0.688( )0.413( )0.557( 
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Table 10: Financial Constraints and The Investment-Liquidity Sensitivity - Payout Ratio  
This table reports the results from estimating Equation (2) with two-stage panel regressions with firm fixed 
effects and year dummies. The variable q is instrumented with two lags of q’s first difference. In the second 
column, the table states the expected sign for each independent variable. The dependent variable is log 
transformed in the following form: ln [𝑦/(1 − 𝑦)], where y is the dependent variable. The log values of Amihud 
and Turnover are included in the regressions. The estimated equation is: 
𝐼𝑡+1
𝐾𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 +
 𝛽2 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽3 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽4  
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡+1
𝑇𝐴𝑡
+ 𝛽5 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽7 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 +
 𝛽8 𝑞𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡, where the dependent variable (I) is the firm’s capital expenditure at time t+1 scaled by the beginning 
period capital (K) in the first two models and scaled by the beginning period total asset (TA) in the last two 
models. High_Payout is a financial constraint dummy that takes one if the firm is assigned in the top payout 
quartile or has a negative payout ratio within its country and zero otherwise. The payout rank is based on the sum 
of cash dividends and stock repurchases scaled by income before extraordinary items and conducted on an annual 
basis. Liquidity * High_Payout is an interaction variable between Liquidity and the dummy variable 
High_Payout. Full definitions of the variables appearing in the equation above are provided in Table 1 Panel A. 
Standard errors used are Huber-white corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. P-values of 
zero coefficient hypothesis are reported in parentheses for each independent variable. The last two rows report 
two instrumental variables tests. The under identification test (Kleibergan-Paap) tests the null hypothesis that the 
correlation between the endogenous variable (q) and the instruments is zero. The over identification test (Hansen 
J) tests the null hypothesis that the correlation between the instruments and the error terms is zero. The subscripts 
***, **, * refer to 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable CAPXt+1/Kt CAPXt+1/TAt 
 E[sign] Amihud Turnover Amihud Turnover 
Liquidityt + 0.068*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.027*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) )0.002( 
Liquidityt * 
High_Payoutt 
- 
-0.012*** -0.044*** -0.008* -0.030*** 
  )0.009( )0.000( )0.060( )0.000( 
FCFt+1 + 2.411*** 2.367*** 2.613*** 2.583*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leveraget - -1.323*** -1.406*** -1.057*** -1.104*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Salest + 0.347*** 0.357*** 0.477*** 0.481*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Casht + 2.254*** 2.266*** 1.123*** 1.130*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
qt + 0.274*** 0.331*** 0.238*** 0.273*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2  0.0903 0.0854 0.1075 0.1054 
# Firms  6565 6565 6671 6671 
# Observations  41508 41511 42579 42582 
IV tests      
Kleibergan-Paap  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen J  )0.999( )0.721( )0.798( )0.981( 
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Table 11: Financial Constraints and The Investment-Liquidity Sensitivity - Kaplan-Zingales Index  
This table reports the results from estimating Equation (2) with two-stage panel regressions with firm fixed 
effects and year dummies. The variable q is instrumented with two lags of q’s first difference. In the second 
column, the table states the expected sign for each independent variable. The dependent variable is log 
transformed in the following form: ln [𝑦/(1 − 𝑦)], where y is the dependent variable. The log values of Amihud 
and Turnover are included in the regressions. The estimated equation is: 
𝐼𝑡+1
𝐾𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 +
 𝛽2 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝐾𝑍𝑡 +  𝛽3 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝐾𝑍𝑡 + 𝛽4  
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡+1
𝑇𝐴𝑡
+ 𝛽5 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽7 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 +  𝛽8 𝑞𝑡 +
𝜀𝑡, where the dependent variable (I) is the firm’s capital expenditure at time t+1 scaled by the beginning period 
capital (K) in the first two models and scaled by the beginning period total asset (TA) in the last two models. 
High_KZ is a financial constraint dummy that takes one if the firm is assigned in the top KZ index quartile within 
its country and zero otherwise. The KZ index rank is conducted on an annual basis. Liquidity * High_KZ is an 
interaction variable between Liquidity and the dummy variable High_KZ. Full definitions of the variables 
appearing in the equation above are provided in Table 1 Panel A. Standard errors used are Huber-white corrected 
for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. P-values of zero coefficient hypothesis are reported in 
parentheses for each independent variable. The last two rows report two instrumental variables tests. The under 
identification test (Kleibergan-Paap) tests the null hypothesis that the correlation between the endogenous 
variable (q) and the instruments is zero. The over identification test (Hansen J) tests the null hypothesis that the 
correlation between the instruments and the error terms is zero. The subscripts ***, **, * refer to 1%, 5%, and 
10% statistical significance levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable CAPXt+1/Kt CAPXt+1/TAt 
 E[sign] Amihud Turnover Amihud Turnover 
Liquidityt + 0.061*** 0.023** 0.034*** 0.009 
  (0.000) )0.028( (0.000) )0.290( 
Liquidityt * 
High_Levt 
- 
0.020*** 0.038*** 0.021*** 0.038*** 
  )0.001( )0.003( (0.000) )0.001( 
      
FCFt+1 + 2.516*** 2.484*** 2.667*** 2.645*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leveraget - -1.272*** -1.367*** -1.052*** -1.116*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Salest + 0.380*** 0.393*** 0.499*** 0.505*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Casht + 2.270*** 2.283*** 1.090*** 1.096*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
qt + 0.295*** 0.353*** 0.254*** 0.289*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2  0.0868 0.0810 0.1071 0.1054 
# Firms  6594 6594 6690 6690 
# Observations  42126 42129 43086 43089 
IV tests      
Kleibergan-Paap  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen J  )0.559( )0.779( )0.312( )0.424( 
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liquidity and this indicator is negative and statistically significant in all models. Earlier, we 
introduce payout ratio as a determinant of financial constraint that decreases in the level of 
financial constraints. Therefore, the negative signed coefficient of the interaction variable 
provides more evidence to our second hypothesis that the impact of stock liquidity on future 
investment is weaker on less financially constrained firms. 
 Lastly, Table 11 shows the results from Kaplan and Zingales (1997)’s index. As point out 
earlier, KZ index increases with the financial constraint level. Like leverage ratio, we expect the 
interaction variable to have a positive coefficient, indicating a stronger effect of liquidity of 
future investments for more financially constrained firms. Indeed, our estimates of the interaction 
variable are positive and statistically significant in all models. Finally, these results are indicators 
of the robustness of our findings, which suggest that the effect of stock liquidity on future 
investments is more prominent in the more financially constrained firms.    
5. Conclusion 
In this study, we investigate the relation between stock liquidity and firms’ future 
investments. We hypothesize that firms’ investment growth is influenced by the potential 
reduction in cost of equity as a result of increases in stock liquidity. In addition, we shed light on 
the impact of financial constraints on the liquidity and future investment relation. We argue that 
the effect of stock liquidity on future investments is more pronounced in more financially 
constrained firms due to the limited access for other external capital. 
Using a sample of more than 9800 firms, from 21 emerging markets and spanning from 2000 
to 2015, we find supportive and robust evidence to both hypotheses. Our findings are robust due 
to using alternative measures of investments and liquidity, alternative robust model 
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specifications and controlling for time and country effects. In addition to finding a positive 
relation between stock liquidity and future investments, our findings highly suggest that the 
liquidity effect on future investments is more prominent in more financially constrained firms, 
using size, leverage ratio, payout ratio and Kaplan and Zingales (1997)’s index as alternative 
determinants of financial constraints.  
Our findings have implications for both managers and policymakers. For managers seeking 
growth, our findings indicate how important it is to boost market liquidity through different 
strategies (e.g. splits, cross-listing, meeting index criteria. etc). In addition, as our findings 
suggest that more financially constrained stocks benefit more from stock liquidity increases, 
firms with more financial constraints should be more encouraged to find ways to boost its stock 
liquidity to achieve growth objectives. Similarly, policymakers, in relatively less liquid markets 
like emerging markets, should realize the importance of finding ways to enhance the aggregate 
market liquidity to help stimulate growth in the capital market, especially low growth firms 
whose growth is essentially constrained by limited access to capital. Policymakers could pursue 
liquidity enhancing strategies to achieve such objectives (e.g. liberalize/open capital market for 
foreign investors and relax regulations for entry in the market etc.) 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A1: Variable Descriptions 
This table describes the variables used in chapter one. 
Variable Description 
Market Return the value-weighted average of the return of all individual stocks in each country in a 
given month. Data is obtained from Global Compustat. 
Market Volatility the monthly standard deviation of the value-weighted market return multiplied by the 
square root of 22 (the number of days in a month). Data is obtained from Global 
Compustat. 
Market Liquidity the value-weighted average of the monthly Amihud measure-computed as the 
average over the month of the daily absolute stock return divided by local currency 
trading volume (multiplied by -10,0000) of all individual stocks in each country in a 
given month. Data is obtained from Global Compustat. 
Market Turnover the value-weighted average of the turnover-defined as the average daily trading 
volume divided by the number of shares outstanding at the beginning of year- of all 
individual stocks in each country in a given month of all individual stocks in each 
country in a given month. Data is obtained from Global Compustat. 
Short-term Interest 
Rate 
For each country, the local short term interest rate is defined as the 3-month treasury 
bills. If not available, we use the money market rate, deposit rate or the lending rate. 
Data is obtained from International Financial Statistics of IMF. 
U.S. Commercial 
Spread 
The difference between the percentage 90-day AA nonfinancial commercial paper 
interest rate and the 3-mnth T-bill rate. Data is obtained from the Federal Reserve. 
𝑅𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟
2  Computation is similar to the liquidity commonality measure 𝑅𝐴𝑚𝑖ℎ𝑢𝑑
2 , which is 
described in details in section 2.2. It is orthognolized to supply side factors by 
computing the residuals from a regression of it on supply factors, namely local short-
term Interest Rate and U.S. Commercial Paper for each country. Data is obtained 
from Global Compustat. 
Net % Equity Flow For each country, it is the difference of the item: “Gross purchases of foreign stock 
by foreigners to U.S. residents” and the item: “Gross purchases of foreign stocks b 
foreigners from U.S. residents” scaled by the sum of the two items. Data is obtained 
from Treasury International Capital (TIC). 
Gross Capital 
Flow/GDP 
For each country, it is the sum of the item: “Gross sales of long-term domestic and 
foreign securities by foreigners to U.S. residents and the item:” Gross purchases of 
long-term domestic and foreign securities by foreigners from U.S. residents” scaled 
by GDP. Data is obtained from Treasury International Capital (TIC). 
Exchange rate For each country, it is the changes of local currencies relative to Special Drawing 
Rights (SDR). Data is obtained from International Financial Statistics of IMF. 
U.S. sentiment index Constructed by Baker and Wurgler (2006) and obtained from Wurgler’s website 
Oil Return Log difference of oil futures price in t and t-1. Data is obtained from U.S. Energy 
information administration. 
Oil Volatility The conditional variance of the GARCH process of Oil Return. Details on 
computations can be found in section 2.3. Data is obtained from U.S. Energy 
information administration 
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Table A2: Oil data by country 
This table reports the country medians of GDP (in constant 2005 billion $US), production, consumption, exports and imports of crude oil (in thousands barrels 
per day), over the period 1995 to 2012. It also reports the median of the oil sensitivity ratio, which is defined as the absolute value of the difference in oil exports 
and imports scaled by GDP in constant 2005 Billion U.S. Dollar. The last 6 columns are indicators of the variables, production, consumption, export, import, 
and oil sensitivity ratio that are set to “Yes” if the country median of the variable is above the median of all countries for that variable; they are set to “No” 
otherwise. The indicators net producer and net exporter are reported “Yes” if the country is a net producer and net exporter by median, respectively, and “No” 
otherwise.. 
Country GDP Prod. Cons. Exports Imports 
Oil 
Sens. 
Ratio 
High 
Prod. 
High 
Cons. 
High 
Export 
High 
Import 
High 
Oil 
Sens. 
Net 
Producer 
Net 
Exporter 
              
Saudi Arabia 314.18 10195.76 1829.50 6693.25 0.00 21.30 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Nigeria 105.92 2236.80 281.13 2092.27 0.00 19.75 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Kuwait 72.32 2358.71 291.57 1354.14 0.00 18.72 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
UAE 168.99 2713.79 469.59 2122.80 0.00 12.56 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Qatar 60.80 1090.35 77.36 683.23 0.00 11.24 Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Norway 297.15 3062.36 221.55 2692.84 18.58 9.00 Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Singapore 121.46 9.90 776.82 0.70 975.04 8.02 No Yes No Yes Yes No No 
Russia 716.23 8904.27 2767.98 4663.78 78.26 6.40 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Thailand 180.77 259.84 961.01 37.71 786.06 4.14 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
S. Korea 856.13 17.08 2165.25 1.99 2382.05 2.78 No Yes No Yes Yes No No 
Philippines 99.23 19.20 330.52 0.00 244.60 2.46 Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No 
India 792.38 826.41 2488.29 0.00 1850.33 2.34 Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No 
Mexico 838.96 3441.01 2069.42 1707.55 8.59 2.03 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Netherlands 659.44 49.88 933.26 23.22 1282.84 1.91 No No Yes Yes Yes No No 
Greece 222.42 7.11 401.30 0.10 409.80 1.84 No Yes No Yes Yes No No 
Belgium 376.02 11.34 625.27 62.02 717.84 1.74 No No Yes Yes Yes No No 
Sri Lanka 23.69 -0.52 79.63 0.00 40.33 1.70 No Yes No Yes Yes No No 
Israel 138.88 3.81 244.11 0.00 232.22 1.67 No Yes No Yes Yes No No 
S. Africa 246.17 201.97 497.06 1.00 411.85 1.67 Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No 
Chile 118.44 17.16 262.20 0.00 192.22 1.62 No Yes No Yes Yes No No 
Malaysia 136.70 766.00 493.95 365.04 147.80 1.59 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Egypt 87.61 738.85 584.31 139.15 0.00 1.59 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Portugal 193.39 3.97 305.36 0.00 270.85 1.40 No No No Yes Yes No No 
Pakistan 102.20 63.85 358.60 1.55 144.68 1.40 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Finland 195.15 9.16 212.15 0.00 234.12 1.20 No No No Yes Yes No No 
Poland 297.31 26.53 442.40 4.28 359.36 1.19 No No No Yes No No No 
Sweden 372.99 4.03 365.02 8.97 408.27 1.07 No No Yes Yes No No No 
Spain 1098.61 28.33 1454.26 0.00 1165.66 1.06 No No No Yes No No No 
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Table A2 - Continued 
Turkey 449.45 53.01 658.54 0.00 470.70 1.05 No No No Yes No No No 
Italy 1802.45 147.15 1831.73 16.68 1813.94 1.00 No No No Yes No No No 
Japan 4446.03 122.23 5293.08 0.00 4275.99 0.96 No No No No No No No 
China 2152.96 3623.83 6007.80 147.37 2127.35 0.92 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Peru 72.73 117.49 159.58 20.33 87.05 0.92 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Argentina 214.77 811.80 543.18 206.17 14.20 0.89 Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
USA 12438.81 9028.10 19508.65 127.45 10267.64 0.82 Yes No No No No No No 
Canada 1111.31 3104.97 2192.24 1722.36 849.22 0.79 Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
France 2139.42 89.15 1984.17 5.59 1684.36 0.78 No No No No No No No 
Germany 2848.20 135.33 2663.63 14.62 2125.58 0.74 No No No No No No No 
Indonesia 278.17 1214.35 1187.62 504.07 307.32 0.71 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
New Zealand 109.22 47.82 147.90 27.62 97.62 0.64 Yes No Yes No No No No 
Austria 306.18 26.64 268.07 0.47 166.77 0.54 No No No No No No No 
Denmark 255.21 296.55 190.54 188.79 79.03 0.43 Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes 
Bangladish 66.64 5.05 83.32 0.00 25.02 0.38 No No No No No No No 
Ireland 194.60 -0.24 168.99 0.00 63.04 0.32 No No No No No No No 
Switzerland 398.52 2.60 267.34 0.00 101.07 0.25 No No No No No No No 
Australia 666.39 616.96 934.72 275.75 418.79 0.21 Yes No Yes No No No No 
Brazil 875.49 1843.19 2126.56 238.34 409.55 0.20 Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
UK 2320.06 100.09 1762.40 1436.75 1111.29 0.14 No No Yes No No No Yes 
Tawian 10587.58 9.48 932.42 0.00 835.50 0.08 No No No No No No No 
Hong Kong 171.63 0.00 295.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 No No No No No No No 
              
Mean 1055.99 1169.25 1423.94 551.76 793.85 3.12        
Median 278.17 100.09 497.06 14.62 270.85 1.19        
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